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The practice of non-proliferation has evolved significantly since its origins during 
the Cold War. The most recent and notable contribution to the non-proliferation regime 
has come in the form of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose consortium of 
102 nation-states through which countries can coordinate, share intelligence, and build 
capacity to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related transfers. My objective 
in this paper is to move beyond the “activity not an organisation” rhetoric espoused by 
proponents of the PSI and to ask a set of deeper and broader questions regarding why 
transgovernmental networks (TGNs) like the PSI arise and take the form that they do. I 
argue that for certain issue areas TGNs provide a more suitable organisational design and 
mechanism for cooperation than IGOs. They offer managerial and participating states a 
range of functional and strategic benefits that a formal centralised structure is unable to 
provide. To achieve this objective, I identify 14 threshold criteria for an entity to qualify 
as a TGN from which I derive six drivers of TGN-formation and cooperation. I also 
explore the relationship between power and transgovernmental networking, focusing 
specifically on the role of the U.S. in establishing, managing, and monitoring these 
institutions. I suggest that TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur and succeed 
when there is concentrated power, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor, like the 
U.S. willing to exercise managerial power in a productive way.   
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Chapter One  
An Introduction to Regime Evolution and Transgovernmental Networks 
   
The practice of non-proliferation has evolved significantly since its origins during 
the Cold War. The most recent and notable contribution to the non-proliferation regime 
has come in the form of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose consortium of 
102 nation-states,1 through which countries can “coordinate, share intelligence, and build 
capacity to interdict WMD related transfers.”2 The initiative is frequently hailed by U.S. 
public officials as “an activity not an organization,”3 and it follows in the footsteps of 
other multilateral export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the 
NPT Nuclear Exports Committee (the Zangger Committee), the Missile Technology 
Regime (MTC), and the Australia group (AG). Like the PSI, these regime components 
lack a formal treaty basis and agreements are implemented through national laws and 
regulations. While nonbinding agreements and informal agreements are not new or 
exceptional, these arrangements constitute what Keohane, Nye, and Slaughter have 
referred to as transgovernmental networks (TGNs) – an increasingly ubiquitous 
                                                
1 U.S. Department of State, Thailand Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative, November 2012, 
Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200849.htm Accessed on March 1, 2013 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 32  
3 Joseph G. Robert, Broadening and Deepening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation, Remarks 
in Warsaw, Poland, June 23, 2006, Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/68269.htm Accessed on 
March 1, 2013 
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component of modern global governance and regulation.4 These networks are defined by 
loose cooperation amongst sub-state officials; they often lack executive oversight and 
bureaucratic structures, and are depicted as more flexible and cost-effective than treaty-
based arrangements. They occupy a middle group between formal cooperation through 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and informal verbal agreements. As Charles 
Lipson notes, they are  “willows, not oaks.”5 Although both the PSI and the multilateral 
export control efforts fall under the scope of TGNs, the multilateral export control 
initiatives play a supporting and subsidiary role to the existing treaty/IGO structure, while 
the PSI represents a significant evolutionary step for TGNs. It exists independent of the 
formal structure and constitutes the political core of collective action,  
My objective in this paper is to move beyond the “activity not an organisation” 
rhetoric espoused by proponents of the PSI and to ask a set of deeper and broader 
questions regarding why TGNs like the PSI arise and take the form that they do. In this 
assessment, I define my dependent variable as the formation of TGNs, while my 
independent variables are the drivers and determinants of TGN-based cooperation. I 
argue that for certain issue areas TGNs provide a more suitable organisational design and 
mechanism for cooperation than IGOs. TGNs are not simply a reaction to globalisation 
and technical complexity,6 they also provide a range of functional and strategic benefits 
                                                
4 The concept of transgovernmental relations was pioneered by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s. Anne Marie 
Slaughter is the foremost proponent of transgovernmentalism in the 21st century.  
5 Lipson, Charles, 'Why are Some International Agreements Informal?' International Organization, 1991, 
Vol. 45(4), pp. 495-538, p. 500 
 
6 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, ‘Transgovernmental Networks and Non-proliferation,’ Paper Presented at 
the New Power Politics Workshop, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, 
March 2013, p. 2 
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to dominant and participating states that formal centralised structures like IGOs are 
unable to provide. Functionality in this paper refers to the capacity to manage tasks, the 
ability to bring participants to the negotiating forum, to achieve levels of coordination, 
and to respond to changing threats. This paper is not intended to be an assessment of how 
effective TGNs are in achieving their ultimate objective. While research on the 
effectiveness of TGNs is much needed and is likely to form the subject of further 
investigation, this paper focuses specifically on why TGNs arise. I look to contribute to 
our understanding of the kinds of organisational benefits that a TGN can offer to 
managerial and participant states. Furthermore, given that American officials in close 
cooperation with their allies have founded the vast majority of existing TGNs7 and that 
the literature on TGNs has largely ignored underlying power distributions, I explore the 
relationship between power and transgovernmental networking. I focus specifically on 
the role of the U.S. in establishing, managing, and monitoring these institutions. I argue 
that TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur and succeed when there is 
concentrated power, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor, like the U.S. willing to 
exercise managerial power in a productive way.   
To demonstrate the dynamics and evolution of transgovernmental networking, I 
apply the TGN analytical framework to a recent, successful, and in some way novel 
example of transgovernmental security cooperation, the PSI. I ask three questions: 1) 
What does the need for an institutional framework like the PSI suggest about the evolving 
nature of the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime? 2) How does the type of role 
                                                
7 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2013 
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and the nature of power exercised by the U.S. relate to the players, the organisational 
structure, and the content of the PSI? 3) If the PSI-TGN interdiction model is deemed to 
be an effective framework for global cooperation, then can it be transferred to other 
regimes and security problems awaiting an enforcement mechanism, such as small arms?  
The PSI has been the subject of considerable scholarly and policy attention for a 
number of reasons. First, it reflects a growth in the role of TGNs within the non-
proliferation regime. Second, the timeframe in which the PSI evolved and became 
functional was marked by unusual speed and effectiveness. Third, the rules for 
interdiction and the obligations on, and expectations of member states were not set out at 
the time of its establishment. Fourth, it has been credited with numerous successes, 
including more than two-dozen interdictions of WMD-related technology and shipments 
to Iran as well as the exposure of the A.Q Khan nuclear smuggling network in 2003. In 
this paper I take stock of and add to past work on the PSI by exploring changing patterns 
of cooperation within the non-proliferation regime. I argue that the issue-area of non-
proliferation supports the transgovernmentalist perspective – the belief that although 
globalisation presents significant challenges to states, they are not disappearing or being 
replaced as the primary source of governance. Instead, states are increasingly 
disaggregating into their functional components, and these distinct parts “are networking 
with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new 
transgovernmental order.”8 While TGNs can provide an alternative to cooperation based 
on multilateral treaties coupled with support from formal IGOs, TGNs and IGOs do not 
                                                
8 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘The Real New World Order,’ Foreign Affairs, 1997, Vol. 76, pp. 183-197, p. 184 
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have to be competitive architectures of cooperation. TGNs and IGOs can work 
synergistically within a particular issue area. States will select different levels of 
formality and structure depending upon the given situation and the factors influencing 
their interests. The next step for the PSI-TGN is to engage proactively with private 
industry actors to establish a “network of networks”, that is, a web of denial that greatly 
diminishes if not eliminates the threat of WMD proliferation.9  
This paper is organised into four major sections. Chapter Two begins with a 
discussion of international regimes, including the distinction between formal IGOs and 
TGNs. The current debate on TGNs has focused on whether TGNs and IGOs have 
become functional substitutes or if they are simply precursors for more obligatory 
agreements.10 In this chapter, I argue that for some issue areas TGNs can provide a more 
favourable organisational design and mechanism for cooperation than IGOs. I identify 14 
threshold criteria for an entity to qualify as a TGN and then outline the functional and 
strategic benefits that TGN-based cooperation provides. From this, I derive 6 hypotheses 
regarding when we might expect TGN-formation. I argue that the decision to use one 
organisational form rather than another is a deliberate choice on the part of an actor 
exercising leadership and managerial power, namely the U.S. Depending upon the 
interests of and forces influencing upon U.S. policy, American officials will employ 
                                                
9 Roberts, Guy, Interview, 26 March 2013 
10 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2013 
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different strategies to engage with different actors. U.S. behaviour within a TGN 
resembles that of a “quasi-imperial manager.”11  
In chapter Three, I apply the TGN framework to the PSI. I argue that while TGNs 
are not new to the non-proliferation regime, the PSI constitutes an evolution of the TGN 
framework. The PSI is not only a noteworthy response to growing concerns over a series 
of new challenges but it also represents a strategic choice on the part of U.S. policy 
makers to place a TGN at the political core of cooperation. Arms control policies have 
traditionally fallen into the domain of high-politics and have relied upon treaty-based 
agreements. IGOs such as the United Nations (UN), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have thus far been 
the primary engines for creating and enforcing the non-proliferation norms. While TGNs 
like the NSG and AU exist within the state-centric regime, they act as subsidiaries to the 
treaty/IGO structure. They plug gaps on technical issues as opposed to functioning as an 
alternative institutional design for cooperation. The PSI-TGN framework, on the other 
hand, allows U.S. policymakers to address some of the legal and definitional challenges 
posed by the treaty based regime, particularly concerning interdiction on the high seas, 
without actually changing the existing regime. In this instance, cooperation through a 
TGN enabled collective action on a pressing issue of security concern without resolving 
or addressing the challenges posed by collective law. Given the nature of the threats 
facing the non-proliferation regime today, treaties which necessitate approval by 
                                                
11 Avant, Deborah, US Relations and Global Security “Governance”: Hegemonic versus Quasi-imperial 
Strategies, Paper prepared for the 2012 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New 
Orleans, 30 August – 2 September, pp. 1-23  
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domestic legislatures and multiple rounds of international negotiations are far too 
cumbersome and time consuming to implement or amend. Moreover, this Chapter will 
demonstrate that the behaviour of the U.S. in the creation, implementation, and 
enforcement of the PSI resembled that of a quasi-imperial manager. Rather than acting as 
a hegemon, U.S. policy makers chose to interact with an array of state and substate actors 
to shape policy through “soft law” arrangements. The U.S. was initially determined to 
keep the PSI proposal confidential and away from public or international scrutiny. It 
sought autonomy in determining the draft principles for interdiction. Once the President 
had approved the draft document, U.S. policy makers were keen to act quickly and with 
authority in their efforts to implement the PSI. The players, the organisational structure, 
and the guiding principles of this TGN all reflect the power dynamics underlying the PSI. 
In Chapter Four, I consider whether the PSI-TGN model could be extended to 
include non-state actors and promoted to fit select transnational issues that require 
immediate attention but where implementing rapid treaties may be politically difficult. 
For instance, the PSI Statement of Principles (SIP) could be combined with programmes 
to disrupt the small-arms trade by land, sea, and air if the U.S. was interested in pursuing 
it. Both require similar intelligence, legal, and military tools. Overall, this paper aims to 
illustrate the dynamics and evolution of transgovernmental networking within and 








Theories of International Cooperation and Transgovernmental Relations 
  
Since the end of the Cold War, the term “regime” has increasingly come to be 
associated and appended to the term “non-proliferation.”12 Although some scholars 
disagree about the impetus for regime creation and compliance, there is an understanding 
amongst most academics and policy makers that a non-proliferation regime exists. This 
regime is concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and related materials to states 
and non-state actors. Keohane, for instance, notes that the explicit purpose of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime in the 1970s was to keep nuclear materials and knowledge from 
diffusing rapidly to potential nuclear powers.13 Rublee discusses the norm of nuclear 
restraint and points to some of the non-proliferation regime’s list of “high-prolife and 
brazen” failures as well as successes.14  
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the theoretical foundations for an analysis of 
the PSI within the context of the non-proliferation regime. The overarching objective is to 
                                                
12 Smith, Roger K, 'Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International 
Relations Theory,' in International Organization, 1987, Vol. 41 (2), pp. 253-254 
13 Keohane, Robert. O, 'The Demand for International Regimes,' in International Organization, Vol. 36 (2) 
International Regimes, 1982, pp. 325-355, p. 352  
14 Rublee, Maria Rost, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restrains (Athens, London: 
University of Georgia Press, 2009) 
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identify why, in recent years, U.S. policy makers have favoured TGN-based cooperation 
as opposed to other more formal architectures of cooperation. I begin by briefly 
surveying contending definitions and characteristics of international regimes and the 
theoretical approaches to regime development. I explore contributions made by various 
theories to the study of international regimes including, realism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, and constructivism. I supplement my primarily institutionalist approach 
with valuable insights from constructivism, which I see as complementary rather than 
competitive. As constructivists assert, institutions like TGNs are not simply the “artefacts 
of strategically and rationally motivated state actors” but they are “also the location in 
which reflexive new practices and policies develop.”15 States may choose to operate 
through TGNs on the basis of the functional and strategic benefits they offer to 
managerial and participant states, such as reduced transaction costs and speed of 
implementation but these organisations also serve as forums for establishing new 
practices and policies. Crucially, alone none of these theoretical approaches adequately 
explain why states act through formal or informal organisations. They offer key insights 
into the non-proliferation regime and TGN formation but fail to explain the wider trend 
towards TGNs. As such, I draw on varying strands of argumentation, combing 
constructivist thoughts on the role of ideas, norms, and expectations with a focus on the 
way that powerful states structure such organisations to further their own interests in a 
way that induces other states to participate. I then focus specifically on the distinguishing 
features of IGOs and TGNs, concluding that TGNs are not only a way of circumventing 
                                                
15 Haas, Peter. M and Ernst B. Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions,' 
in Journal of International Studies, 2003, Vol. 31, pp. 573-601, p. 575 
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some of the bureaucratic problems posed by IGO based cooperation but they also provide 
a more effective means of bringing together like-minded states who share similar social 
identities to overcome collective action problems.  
 
2.1 What are international regimes and do they matter? 
 
The convergence of international behaviour through regimes has emerged as a 
significant focus for empirical and theoretical research. Liberal internationalists and 
institutionalists have argued that regimes are all-pervasive features of the international 
system and that we can deduce the existence of a regime from patterned behaviour. 
Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins suggest that “a regime exists in every substantive 
issue-area in international relations…Wherever there is regularity in behaviour, some 
kinds of principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it.”16 However, linking 
regularity in patterns of behaviour to the existence of regimes runs the risk of 
overestimating consensus and implicit coordination in the international community. 
Susan Strange, on the other hand, questions the validity and usefulness of the concept of 
regimes all together. For her “using this word regime distorts reality by implying an 
exaggerated measure of predictability and order in the system.”17 This position is 
consistent with a realist or structuralist orientation which envisages an international 
system full of rational self-seeking states that are acting in their own interest. A third way 
                                                
16 Puchala, Donald and Raymond Hopkins, ‘International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,’ in 
International Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 61-91 
 
17 Strange, Susan, ‘Cave! Hic dragones! A critique of regime analysis,’ in International Regimes ed. by 
Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 337-354, p. 345 
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of viewing regimes is described by Krasner as modified structuralism. “In a world of 
sovereign states the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve 
desired outcomes in particular issue areas.”18 This is a middle path between the structural 
realists who see no value in the concept of regimes and the institutionalists who see 
regimes as being an ever-prominent feature of international relations. Arthur Stein notes 
that regimes can have an impact when Pareto-optimal outcomes19 could not be achieved 
by states going it alone or through uncoordinated action. Regimes are created to manage 
the suboptimality that can emerge from individual state behaviour.20 This approach is 
helpful in explaining and understanding the non-proliferation regime, as the very nature 
of the objective of preventing and actively curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
related materials is dependent upon coordination and cooperation between multiple 
states, sub-state units, and non-state actors.  
Another possible and more helpful way to understand the role of regimes and 
their institutional components in international relations is through a constructivist lens. 
Constructivists have sought to reassert the importance of social context into international 
relations. As Alexander Wendt argues, “through repeated acts of reciprocal cooperation, 
actors form mutual expectations that enable them to continue cooperation.”21 The demand 
for regimes depends upon actors’ perceptions of international problems, which can be a 
                                                
18 Krasner, Stephan, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,’ in 
International Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1-22, p. 7 
 
19 An outcome is Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome in the game that can make every player just as 
well off without hurting at least one player 
 
20 Stein, Arthur. A, ‘Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world,’ in International 
Regimes ed. by Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-140, p. 1232 
 
21 Wendt, Alexander, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State,’ in The American Political 
Science Review, June 1994, Vol. 88 (2), p. 390 
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product of their norms and beliefs.22 International regimes, according to constructivists, 
do more than simply affect the cost benefit calculations of rational actors – they can 
circumscribe action while also acting as points as reference for acceptable forms of social 
behaviour. Pragmatic constructivists like Peter Haas and Ernst Haas highlight the role 
that institutions can play in generating political change. They regard institutions, “partly 
as arenas for designing change and partly as arrangements that bring about change as they 
alter the perceptions of their members.”23 TGNs, for instance, can be the product of 
managerial states exercises their desire to orchestrate change in a particular issue area, 
while simultaneously altering or solidifying the perceptions of their participant states on 
the issue in question, such as interdiction on the high seas. International regimes can thus 
be conceptualised as principles and understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of 
behaviour,24 which both influence actors and are influenced by actors.   
Furthermore, constructivists argue that social identities and interests are always in 
process during social interaction25 and actors develop understandings of other actors 
through the mechanism of norms and practices. While neorealists prioritise material 
capabilities in international relations, constructivists pay homage to the role of social 
relationships. According to Wendt, social structures have three elements: “shared 
knowledge, material resources, and practices.”26 Material resources of individual states, 
while important, only acquire meaning for human action through the shared knowledge 
                                                
22 Alexander Wendt. 1994. p 389 
 
23 Haas & Haas, p. 575 
 
25 Wendt, 1994, p. 386 
 
26 Wendt, Alexander, ‘Constructing International Politics,’ in International Security, 1995 Vol. 22 (1), pp. 
71-81, p. 73  
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and practices in which they are embedded.27 Social structures like the non-proliferation 
regime help to shape actors’ collective identities, which can then serve as the “basis for 
feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty, and thus form collective definitions of 
interests.”28 These collective identities and interests play out through formal and informal 
institutions like security communities aimed at curbing the proliferation of WMD related 
materials. Exercising collective interests through regimes and security communities does 
not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate individual (state) costs and 
benefits of participation, rather they do so on a higher level of social aggregation.29 This 
higher level of social aggregation discourages free-riding by increasing the willingness of 
like-minded states to collectively bare the costs.  Moreover, international organisations 
(IO) have influence well beyond the material power of individual or collective states. IOs 
can legitimise or delegitimise actions, they can create ideas, norms, and exceptions, and 
they can enhance the power of individual states. States (managerial or participant) 
consciously use these organisations both for their functional benefits such as reduced 
transaction costs and increased organisational efficiency, and more broadly to influence 
interests and understandings of other states.  
How do we know when we see a regime? Constructivist John Ruggie first 
introduced the concept of regimes in 1975, defining it as "a set of mutual expectations, 
rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which 
                                                
27 Wendt, 1995, p. 73 
28 Wendt, 1994, p. 386 
29 Wendt, 1994, p. 386 
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have been accepted by a group of states."30 In 1983, Krasner refined this definition to 
include “a set of implicit or explicit norms, principles, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.”31 Principles are defined as “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude”; norms as 
“standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”; rules as “specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action”; and decision-making procedures as “prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective action.”32 The above definition forms 
the foundation of this paper and is consistent with other recent understandings of regimes. 
Ernst Hass, for instance, argues that “regimes are norms, rules, and procedures agreed to 
by states in order to regulate an issue-area.”33 He goes on to suggest that “regimes may be 
housed in single international organizations, comprise the activities of several such 
organs, or dispense with formal organization altogether.”34 As an example, the non-
proliferation regime consists of a variety of components, both formal and informal in 
nature, from the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 
Proliferation Security Initiative. Similarly and perhaps most famously, Keohane and Nye 
define regimes as “networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour 
                                                
30 Ruggie, John Gerard, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,’ in International 
Organization, 1975, Vol. 34, p. 570 
31 Krasner, p. 2 
32 Krasner, p. 2 
33 Haas, Ernst, ‘Technological Self-reliance for Latin America: the OAS Contribution,’ International 
Organization, 1980, Vol. 34 (4), p. 552 
34 Ibid.  
 15 
and control its effects.”35 Focusing on interdependence within world politics, they 
suggest that regimes act as an intermediate step, between capabilities and power structure 
within a system, and the political bargaining which occurs within it.  
While there are multiple definitions of regimes, they all have in common the 
understanding that they are not simply makeshift or temporary aspects of international 
relations. They vary over time but they do not change with every shift in national power 
or interest. Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons argue that “regime change” can be 
operationalised in terms of strength, organisational form, scope and allocational mode. 
Strength is measured by the degree of compliance, organisational form refers to issues 
such as the centralisation and decentralisation of the administration apparatus, scope 
concerns the range of issues the regime covers, and allocational mode refers to the 
different social mechanisms for resource distribution.36 To this Krasner adds “change 
within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedure, but not of 
norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles.”37 
The growth of TGNs within the non-proliferation issue area clearly implies change within 
a regime. The rules and decision-making procedures have shifted from formal IGOs to 
looser and less formal modes of cooperation. While the implications of the PSI-TGN 
framework, namely the potential for the development of a new interdiction norm, might 
imply a change of the regime. Thus, regimes and their components clearly can and do 
                                                
35 Keohane, Robert. O and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1997), p. 19 
36 Haggard Stephan and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Theories of International Regimes,’ International 
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evolve, however, they do not change overnight or with every shift in political or strategic 
interest. Regimes are intended to be more permanent features of international politics. 
Given the importance of IGOs and the trend towards TGNs within the non-
proliferation regime, the following two sections will provide a closer examination of 
these two regime components and their distinguishing features. This will include an 
assessment of why TGNs arise and the likelihood for TGN-based cooperation. Drawing 
from these sections, Chapter Three and Chapter Four will provide an in-depth analysis of 
the PSI as it fits within the dynamics of transgovernmental networking and the non-
proliferation regime. 
  
2.2 The Trend Towards Transgovernmental Cooperation 
 
The idea of transgovernmental relations was first pioneered by Keohane and Nye 
in the 1970s. In an article for World Politics journal, the authors question the assumption 
that states are the only actors in the international system and that they always act as 
individual units. Critiquing the ‘black-box’38 view of a state and state interactions, they 
differentiate between two types of international state cooperation - intergovernmental 
cooperation and transgovernmental cooperation. Intergovernmental cooperation refers to 
direct interactions between top leaders, heads of state or foreign offices sustained through 
formal organisations, particularly IGOs. Transgovernmental cooperation, on the other 
                                                
38 A black box state is one whose internal characteristics and behaviour are of little relevance to its external 
actions 
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hand, takes place below the apex of organisational hierarchy.39 It is defined as “sets of 
direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or 
closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments.”40 
Within transgovernmental cooperation two separate categories can be identified. The first 
type of “communication does not necessarily contradict the conventional 
conceptualization of states as coherent coalitions vis-a-vis the outside world.”41 It simply 
refers to the most basic type of informal communication among working level officials of 
bureaucracies. Informal cooperation of this nature can even take place in the corridors of 
IGOs. It can help to assist cooperation through more formal structures or it can act as a 
forum for discussing how to improve the implementation of existing treaties. When these 
ad hoc patterns of coordination and cooperation become regularised and institutionalised, 
a more deliberate form of TGN can arise. To increase the likelihood of success and to 
advance specific policy goals, governmental sub-units may choose to informally 
coordinate their decision-making with actors from other governments through TGNs.42 If 
successful, the products of transgovernmental policy coordination are different than they 
would be if each TGN partner were limited to acting through their own bureaucracy.43  
While the first category of basic and informal transgovernmental relations is of 
analytical and theoretical interest, this second category forms the subject of this paper. 
                                                
39 Keohane, Robert and Joseph S. Nye. ‘Transgovernmental relations and International Organisations.’ 
World Politics, 1974, Vol. 27, pp. 39-62, p. 44  
40 Keohane and Nye. 1974, p. 43  
41 Ibid., p. 44 
42 Keohane and Nye, 1974, p. 47 
43 Ibid.  
 18 
These autonomous and deliberate TGNs are, in and of themselves, sources of governance 
and informal rule making. Within the non-proliferation issue area, the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) initiative, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), 
and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction (“10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program”), The Transhipment Countries Export 
Control Initiative (TECI), the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT), and the PSI are all examples of TGNs. Given the PSI’s ability to generate 
support from 102 different countries and its role in spurring into existence a range of 
other TGNs, it will serves as a the primary case study for this paper. 
To date, the literature on TGNs has paid inadequate attention to the relationship 
between concentrated power and network formation. Some scholars have highlighted the 
need for a powerful state to act as a bureaucratic point of contact within TGNs,44 while 
others have pointed to the effects of regulatory power on policy outcomes. However, 
there has been little discussion of how material and issue-specific power can initiate, 
drive and sustain TGN activity. The U.S. has played a crucial role in forming and steering 
TGN-based cooperation, yet American officials are awarded the same analytical status as 
sub-state representatives from other countries. As will be discussed in greater detail later 
in this Chapter, concentrated power is a precondition for TGN formation. Moreover, as 
Avant notes, “US policy makers are often strategic in determining which relationship(s) 
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Future of Global Governance,’ International Journal, 2005/2006, Vol.61 (1), pp. 179-198, p. 188 
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to work through in pursuit of their goals. Performing one role rather than another, 
however, has consequences.” When the U.S. acts as a hegemon it interacts with states and 
state based IGOs and is constrained by domestic interests.45 For instance, the influence of 
the Jewish lobby on domestic U.S. politics and U.S. ties to Israel, led the Obama 
administration to stymie a UN General Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood in 2011 – 
even through the vote would only elevate the status of the Palestinian Authority from 
nonvoting “observer entity” to “observer state.” Once it became clear that a vote was to 
go ahead, U.S. officials began to exercise hegemonic power by threatening Palestinian 
officials with significant financial retaliations. The U.S. also lobbied allies such as the 
Canada and the United Kingdom to vote against a change in Palestinian status or to 
simply abstain from the vote. In this case, it was in the interest of the U.S. to use its 
power to forestall action rather than encourage change.  
Avant suggests that the U.S. can also use its powers in a more fruitful way to 
generate new action.46 Instead of exhibiting hegemonic traits, the U.S. can act as a quasi-
imperial manager (as it does within TGNs), interacting with a range of state and non-state 
actors to serve both its own interest and the interest of the wider community. While the 
U.S. lacks the kind of control that was typical in more classical empires, it can 
nonetheless influence intermediaries and orchestrate support for a particular action by 
means of its structural and material advantage. Take the private military and security 
services industry as an example. In the wake of incidents in Iraq and criticism from 
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Congress and civil society groups, the U.S. began to participate in and lead a range of 
multi-stakeholder informal regulatory initiatives, such as the Montreux Process. Given 
that a number of private military and security companies (PMSC) are headquartered in 
the United States, U.S. officials saw this Swiss initiative as an opportunity to both 
respond to critiques regarding the PMSC industry, while simultaneously controlling the 
market for force.47 In turn, U.S. policy and regulation were informed by the language and 
content of the Montreux document, which highlighted the deficiencies in the U.S. system 
that led to problems in Iraq and Afghanistan.48 The U.S. plays a similar role in the 
orchestration and management of TGN-based cooperation. When the U.S. wants to 
generate new action, there are limits to what hegemonic power and going it alone can 
accomplish. While the U.S. could work through IGOs, these formal arrangements are 
tedious and more susceptible to international intransigence. As the U.S. possesses 
sufficient levels of material and issue specific power to bring together sub state units are 
well connected, that already share their preferences, and have demonstrated capacity to 
affect the issue in the past, it is more rational for them to establish and manage their own 
mechanism for cooperation and collective action. Furthermore, the lack of a monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism implies that TGNs may be dependent upon the actor who 
established the network to ensure compliance and enforce cooperation. Thus, TGN-based 
cooperation is more likely to occur when there is concentrated power, such as that 
possessed by the U.S. in certain issue areas. 
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2.3 Intergovernmental Organisations 
 
In order to understand why there has been a growing trend towards TGNs, it is 
important to first consider the characteristics of IGOs and the advantages and 
disadvantages of IGO based cooperation. There exists a large amount of analytical and 
empirical scholarship on IGOs, including patterns in IGO growth and membership and 
the effect of IGOs on state behaviour. States use IGOs in a number of different ways, 
from setting agendas to settling conflicts. They are a ubiquitous feature of international 
regimes, which typically form the regime core. This includes, the non-proliferation 
regime, which has employed IGOs as mechanisms for cooperation.  
There have been numerous attempts to identify empirical criteria for IGOs. In 
1970, Wallace and Singer identified four such criteria: the organisation must consist of at 
least two qualified members of the international system; it must hold regular plenary 
sessions at intervals not greater than a decade; it must have a permanent headquarters; 
and it must be independent from other IGOs.49 Because a significant proportion of the 
literature on IGOs has converged to a three-state definition, Pevehouse, Nordstom, and 
Warnke updated their IGO nomenclature to include a three-state minimum in 2004.50 
While an organisation containing two member states could be of academic and theoretical 
interest, it falls within the domain of bilateral rather than multilateral relations.51 They 
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 22 
define an IGO as: a formal entity (formed by an internationally recognised treaty); with 
three or more sovereign states; and a permanent secretariat with institutional features 
such as a headquarters and/or a permanent staff.52 Taking together these three empirical 
criteria, Volgy, Fausett, Grant and Rodgers offer a conceptual definition of formal IGOs 
(FIGOs) as “entities created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to 
provide formal, ongoing, multilateral processes of decision-making between states, along 
with the capacity to execute the collective will of their members (states).”53 They note 
that this conceptual definition highlights both the process of interactions within FIGOs as 
well as the possibility of collective outcomes from these processes.54 They also identify 
11 threshold values as operational criteria for designating an entity as a FIGO. These 
criteria are outlined in Table 1 below.  
These threshold values listed are helpful in two ways. First, they help us to 
identify the distinguishing features of formal IGOs, which in turn will inform our 
understanding of why states may choose to work through such organisations. Concerns 
relating to membership criterion, rules of governance, budget, and funding independence 
all factor into a state’s decision to pursue cooperation through one form of organisation 
above another. Second, the threshold values will be critical in differentiating between 
IGOs and TGNs, and understanding the reasons behind why TGNs like the PSI arise.  
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Table 1 Threshold Requirements for FIGOs adapted from Thomas Volgy et al. Table I. 
Comparison of Threshold Requirements for FIGO Classification versus Other 
Collections Enumerating IGOs.55  
 
 
Criterion FIGO Data 
Membership  
Number of States Three or more  
Mix  Predominantly by states; no veto on collective 
decision by non-state members 
Representation Representing central governments or its sub-units 
Rules of Governance Specified in charter 
Meetings Routinised and meeting at regular intervals and at 
least every four years 
HQ/Secretariat: Permanent and non-symbolic 
Staffing Presence More than two (paid by IGO) 
Staffing Independence Independence of any IGO or any single state 
Budget  
Amount Sufficient to cover minimal staffing and operation 
Funding mechanism Routinely identified; regularly available 
Source Majority funding not controlled by another IGO or 
one state 
 
Pevehouse et al.’s focus on membership, rules of governance, and budget as 
threshold requirements for formal IGO classification is reflected in Abbott and Snidal’s 
research on why states act through formal international organisation. They propose that 
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formal international organisations offer centralisation and autonomy – two characteristics 
which not only distinguish formal organisations from other international institutions, but 
also produce a range of political effects which make working through an IGO attractive. 
Centralisation refers to: 
 “a concrete and stable organisational structure and an administrative 
apparatus managing collective activities” while independence refers to “the 
authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined 
spheres.”56  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue that established and formal organisation provide a stable 
negotiating forum that enhances iteration and reputational effects. Even at the height of 
the Cold War, the IAEA, for example, served as a superpower forum for discussing 
technical nuclear issues without the intrusion of high politics.57 By increasing 
transparency amongst stakeholders in the negotiating process, IGOs can also serve to 
minimise misperception and avoid miscalculated responses. The diversity of members 
and the scope of application can facilitate long-term cooperation by encouraging issue 
linkages in a variety of different areas. IGOs can also help states take the long view on a 
particular issue or set of relations as opposed to responding to immediate concerns and 
payoffs.  
Representation and voting rules, which are inherent features of certain types of 
IGOs, “constitutionalise” balances among states that have different levels of power, 
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interest, and knowledge.58 States that possess advanced nuclear technologies and large 
quantities of nuclear material are guaranteed seats on the IAEA Board of Governors.59 
IGOs do more than simply support interstate relations; they also act as mechanisms for 
pooling activities, assets, or risks. A stable organisational structure with a specialised 
staff can significantly reduce transaction costs.60 Member states of the World Bank pool 
their financial resources, which enables the organisation to make credible financial 
commitments to borrowers who rely upon them for costly planning and investment 
decisions.61  
The operation of an IGO as an independent, “neutral actor can transform relations 
among states, enhancing the efficiency and legitimacy of collective and individual 
actions.”62 Consider briefly the example of Libya in 2001. On 26 February 2011 the 
Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions against the Libyan authorities. 
Resolution 1970 placed an obligation on all United Nations Member States to:  
“freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic 
resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the individuals or entities” listed in the resolution.63   
 
The document also placed an arms embargo on Libya, calling on all Member States to:  
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“immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect 
supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their 
territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and 
related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition.”64  
 
Furthermore, the resolution marked the first time that a country had been 
unanimously referred to the International Criminal Court by the Security Council. While 
Resolution 1970 was proposed by a small group of states with shared preferences, 
namely, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, approval of the 
resolution by all 15 members of the Security Council generated obligations for the wider 
UN community. Support from states that traditionally disagree with the US gave the 
resolution a neutral overtone, thus enhancing the efficiency and legitimacy of the 
sanctions. A lack of UN approval might have cast an unsavoury light upon U.S. action as 
it did with U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, but with approval. As Abott and Snidal note, 
neutrality adds impartiality to independence,65 facilitating the achievement of a collective 
objective. 
By taking advantage of the threshold requirements of formal IGOs and 
characteristics such as centralisation and independence, states can achieve certain goals 
that they may not have been able to accomplish as effectively through unilateral action or 
direct relations with other actors. IGOs can provide economies of scale, they can act as 
forums for discussion, they can enhance transparency and facilitate issue linkages, and 
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they can encourage states to take the long view. The allure of these benefits persuades 
states to work through formal arrangements as opposed to decentralised ones.  
Abbott and Snidel argue that the move from decentralised cooperation to formal 
international organisations “occurs when the costs of direct state interaction outweigh the 
costs of international organisation, including consequent constraints on unilateral 
action.”66 Drawing from constructivist theories of international relations, I contend that 
while this assessment is correct, it only advances a partial truth. The U.S. may decide to 
move from informal to formal arrangements on the basis of a strategic calculation but 
they may also revert back to decentralised decision-making structures to create new 
information, ideas, norms, and expectations. Moreover, costs and benefits are not always 
known in advance or equal to each participating state. The shift from one organisational 
form to another is not permanent or unidirectional. A decision by U.S. officials to pursue 
a less formalised structure to further collective goals is also based upon a similar 
assessment of the functional and strategic costs and benefits (if known) as well as the 
capacity to influence interests, intersubjective understandings, and the operating 
environment of other states. There are a number of disadvantages to centralised 
cooperation that are considered at length in the next section. However, it is worth 
dedicating some attention to them here. 
First, rather than being a forum for cooperation and consensus, IGOs can become 
a focus of international struggle and disagreement. Although the UN Security Council 
unanimously approved sanctions against Libya in 2011, there are plenty of instances of 
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power struggles hampering the Security Council’s efforts to respond to a crisis. On 19 
July 2011, for instance, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have 
threatened sanctions on Damascus due to negative votes by permanent member Russia 
and China. Other IGOs such as the European Union (EU) are similarly prone to 
controversy.  At present, the EU is struggling to unify around a single economic path for 
the future. One narrative centres on strengthening the EU institutional framework and 
addressing its structural weaknesses, and the other emphasises the need for domestic 
austerity and reform of domestic economic policy. All the while, the UK is attempting to 
renegotiate its membership and calling for a repatriation of powers from the EU to the 
UK.  
Second, the level of support an IGO or a treaty gets is often contingent upon 
whether it promotes participants’ domestic and national interests and/or goals. Realist 
theory and academics like Susan Strange find that the focus on formal IGOs is naïve 
because these regime components merely reflect national interest and power. While 
international law creates an illusion of an ordered system, powerful states like the U.S. 
will only comply with rules and regulations when it is in their self-interest to do so. The 
point at which an IGO policy or treaty begins to diverge from U.S. interests will be the 
point at which U.S. policy makers begin to employ harder and less cooperative forms of 
power. For instance, in 2006 the Bush administration voted against the Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT) as its position in the UN was overly influenced by domestic constituencies 
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like the National Rifle Association (NRA).67 Although eight years later, on 2 April 2013, 
the Obama administration voted with the majority for approval of the ATT, the treaty’s 
ratification prospects in the Senate still appear bleak due to opposition from the gun 
lobby. Furthermore, formal IGOs often give less powerful countries equal representation 
and the tools to stymie regulatory and governance efforts generated by more powerful 
countries. In other words, while powerful countries can veto decisions that are against 
their interests, so too can less powerful countries. Thus, a major limitation of IGO based 
cooperation is that support and success is heavily dependent upon the relationship 
between the issue area under question and the domestic interests of powerful countries 
that may have the capacity to actually implement and enforce the arrangement.  
Finally, formal centralised institutions often suffer from severe budgetary and 
fiscal problems, which can hinder cooperation and the effectiveness of collective action. 
The growing cost of operations and pressures stemming from austerity cuts have left a 
number of countries unwilling or unable to pay their dues. The existing UN assessment 
system, for instance, has left eight member states covering 76% of the overall costs 
despite fiscal challenges within each of those countries. The U.S. is the largest 
contributor to the UN and many have raised concerns over the level of influence and 
leverage that U.S. officials have over UN policy. In 2011, the Obama administration 
decided to cut funding for UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) following its approval of Palestine’s bid for full membership. The 
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requirement to pool resources often generates an expectation regarding a return on 
investment, which can undermines IGO claims to autonomy and independence. Formal 
IGO cooperation, thus, comes with a range of budgetary and fiscal issues. 
In the next section, I draw on the characteristics and weaknesses of IGO based 
cooperation to identify the threshold criteria for TGNs and to assess why TGNs like the 
PSI arise and take the form that they do.  
 
2.4 Identifying the Characteristics of and Conditions for TGN-based Cooperation  
 
Many have pointed to the cross border activities of banks, private corporations, 
criminals, terrorists and non-governmental organisations to demonstrate the prominence 
of networks and to argue that this type of non-state actor cooperation has posed a 
considerable threat to the dominance and authority of states. While these networks are 
certainly an integral component of the international system, they are not simply confined 
to the domain of non-state actors.68  Transgovernmental ties and networks have existed 
for a number of years (the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the World Health 
Organisation (1948)). What is new is the rapid proliferation of these TGNs and the scope 
and strength of the ties between sub-state officials. 
Although TGNs provide an alternative to formal IGO/treaty based cooperation, 
they do not necessarily have to constitute competitive architectures of cooperation. Under 
some conditions, TGNs can support the existing structure and treaty. At other times, they 
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may simply play the role of a gap-filler. They can exist independently, in opposition or in 
congruence with the existing regime. When different components of a regulatory regime 
work together and complement the efforts of one another, they are more likely to be 
effective. This section will identify 14 threshold criteria to qualify an entity as a TGN as 
well as the conditions under which a TGN may arise. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
impetus for transgovernmental networking is not simply based on an assessment of 
functional benefits. TGNs are also underpinned by power politics. Empirically, Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni notes, most TGNs are linked to powerful states, so what prompts states to 
delegate a particular policy to a TGN that does not operate under direct supervision as 
opposed to an IGO that is centralised and has a set operating procedures?69 
Faced with growing the complexity of world politics and an increase in the 
variety of actors regulating a particular issue area, many scholars have called into 
question the realist state-centric analysis of the international system. Liberal 
internationalists have drawn fire from several quarters with some academics arguing that 
globalisation and the rise of non-state actors have undermined the traditional statist 
foundations of the prevailing forms of cooperation. According to a third perspective – the 
transgovernmentalist perspective - although globalisation does challenge the states’ 
regulatory capacity, “states remain the only actors with the authority to provide effective 
and legitimate governance.”70 While the state is not disappearing, it is being forced to 
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change the way that it engages with its counterparts and variety of non-state actors both 
within its domestic constituency and abroad. 
 
2.4.1 TGN Characteristics 
 
So what are the threshold criteria for qualifying as a TGN? Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
suggests that to bring the distinguishing institutional traits of TGNs into focus, its helpful 
to first consider TGNs qua networks.71 She identifies three principal features of networks. 
First, networks are flat and decentralized structures with decision-making dispersed 
among multiple actors. They lack a top-down management structure. Lower-level units 
can have relationships with multiple higher-level units as well as lateral links with units 
at the same level of organisation.72 Second, networks tend to have self-enforcing 
governance structures, which rely, to a great extent upon interpersonal trust. Networks 
lack enforcement and legal arbitration procedures; rather, they depend primarily upon 
reputation and expectations of reciprocity to govern relations.73 Third, Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni argues that rather than administrative fiat, the decision-mode within 
networks is predominantly led by deliberation, consensus, and mutual adjustment. The 
lack of a central or governing authority within networks makes them less suitable for 
more structured and rigid forms of decision-making. 
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 33 






Membership   
Number of States Three or more Three or more; initially a 
core group but can 
expand to broader 
membership 
Shared preferences  N/A Initially like-minded 
states; can later be 
expanded to broader 
membership base  
Mix  Predominantly by states; 
no veto on collective 
decision by non-state 
members 
Only sub-state units 
representing states NOT 
NGOs 
Representation Representing central 




Rules of Governance Specified in charter Uncodified 
Meetings Routinised and meeting at 
regular intervals and at 
least every four years 
Regularised but not 
necessarily specified 
HQ/Secretariat Permanent and non-
symbolic 
None 
Staffing Presence More than two (paid by 
IGO) 
None 
Staffing Independence Independence of any IGO 
or any single state 
None 
Decision-mode Formal Voting Deliberation and 
consensus 
Budget   
Amount Sufficient to cover minimal 
staffing and operation 
Unspecified 
Funding mechanism Routinely identified; 
regularly available 
Unspecified 
Source Majority funding not 
controlled by another IGO 
or one state 
Unspecified; May or 
may not be controlled by 
one state 
Legal Basis Treaty No treaty  




While there exists a substantial body of literature on TGNs and the characteristics 
of networks in general, there is a lacuna on the empirical dimensions for identifying 
TGNs. Based on the three network criteria outlined by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and the 
existing literature on TGNs, I present 14 threshold values that may be used to 
operationalise criteria for designating an entity as a TGN. I title the criteria under the 
headings of participation, rules of governance, budget, legal basis, and scope. I by no 
means suggest that these criteria provide a comprehensive and definitive list of TGN 
characteristics. A full assessment of the qualifying features of TGNs will require a 
detailed empirical analysis which tests these criteria against the range of TGNs in 
existence today, which is beyond the scope of the paper.74 For now, I draw upon the 
substantial yet disjointed body of literature on TGNs to offer an assessment of the 
characteristics that might constitute a TGN. These criteria are discussed below and 
summarised in Table 2.  
First, similar to IGOs, I concur that the threshold for participation of a TGN is 
three or more states, or more specifically, constituent sub-units that represent three or 
more states. Although transgovernmental relations might occur between two states, these 
do not constitute a multilateral network as conceived by the majority of the literature on 
TGNs. Instead, they fall within the domain of bilateral transgovernmental relations. 
Furthermore, TGNs tend to arise among a small core group of states.75 The PSI, for 
instance, involved pledges of support from 11 countries in 2003; the Financial Stability 
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Forum (FSF) received endorsement from the Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors of seven states in 1999; and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed 
in 1975 by seven nations with similar nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. While TGNs 
generally arise from a small core group, they can grow to include a much wider 
participant list. The PSI now has 102 participants, the FSF (now replaced by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB)) has extended membership to 20 states, and the NSG membership 
has grown to 46 nuclear supplier states.  
Second, relating to participation, TGNs are traditionally formed by like-minded 
states that share preferences with the dominant and central state. More often than not, the 
state exercising managerial power is the U.S., thus TGN participants tend to be those who 
share preferences with the U.S. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is often 
presented as a successful example of a TGN, facilitates coordination of anti-money 
laundering regulation among 36 liberal democracies.76 The 11 states that were invited to 
participate in the initial stages of PSI deliberations were all states that had previously 
cooperated with the U.S. in the regulation of the non-proliferation issue. Shared 
preferences ease the process of reciprocity amongst states that have in common similar 
perceptions of a particular problem and preferences on how to act. Shared preferences 
will also go some way to explaining network formation in the next section.  
The third and fourth criteria refer to the mix and representation of membership. 
IGOs can be representative of states or sub-state units, TGNs, on the other hand, only 
represent sub-state units of government, populated by experts as opposed to generalist 
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diplomats. The individuals who represent their states are not necessarily expected to 
represent the declared preferences of the executive branch of government. Furthermore, 
while NGOs may be invited to participate in discussions, the very nature of 
transgovernmental relations implies the occurrence of interactions between sub-state 
units as opposed to states and non-state actors. Of course, a TGN can evolve into a multi-
stakeholder process. In fact, this evolution may even be desired and constitute the ideal 
type for certain issue areas. However, the point at which non-state actors begin having a 
weighted say in the deliberations of TGNs is when the transgovernmental network can no 
longer be classified as such; rather, it becomes a transnational network. 
The next set of criteria (five to ten) concern the bureaucratic organisation of the 
TGN, that is, the rules of governance, meetings, HQ/secretariat, staffing presence, 
staffing independence, and decision mode. The rules of governance refer to whether the 
procedural requirements are set out in a charter or a treaty and are easy to uncover or if 
they are uncodified and implicit. For IGOs, Volgy et al. argue that these procedural rules 
are usually set out in a charter and are easily accessible to member states. In TGNs, 
however, since there are no set procedures or rules, there is nothing to codify. Meetings 
are regularised but they are not necessarily specified. There is no explicit agreement that 
those participant sub-units representing states must meet once, twice, or three times a 
year.  While IGOs are often put forth as representative organisations where voting is 
conducted through formal procedures and where majority rule may apply, TGNs operate 
on the basis of deliberation and consensus.77  A functional benefit of TGNs is that, unlike 
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IGOs, they are not limited by the constraints of formal voting and equal representation. 
TGNs also lack a secretariat and in turn a permanent staffing presence.  Of the known 
TGNs, only the Wassenaar Arrangement has a central secretariat. The CSI, NSG, the 
Zangger committee, the Missile Technology Regime (MTC), and the AG all lack a 
centralised international HQ. Staff is usually drawn from or attached to a particular 
participant state (usually the state that is exercising leadership or acting as the focal point 
for the TGN). For instance, Japan for the NSG, France for the MTCR, Australia for the 
AG, and the U.S. for the PSI. In turn, TGN staff is neither autonomous nor independent. 
Staff members are derived from a particular country and are therefore likely and perhaps 
even expected to reflect the interests of that country.  
Permanent professional staffing requires a permanent source of funding. This 
raises the next set of criteria concerning budgets. Given that TGN-based cooperation is 
informal with each participant implementing and enforcing agreements in accordance 
with domestic laws and practice,78 TGNs tend to lack a pooled budget that is routinely 
and systematically available to participants or independent of any one-member state. As 
the TGN lacks a codified charter, the budget amount, the funding mechanism, and the 
source of funding are all unspecified. If anything, like the staffing presence, funding for 
particular projects tends to be associated with or linked to dominant or powerful states, 
usually the U.S., which also acts as the focal point for negotiations and plays a 
managerial role.    
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IGO agreements are predominately legalised through a formal treaty. TGNs tend 
to lack this kind of legal treaty basis. Some TGNs like the EU dual-use regime, the 
Zangger Committee, and other multilateral export control efforts are loosely attached to 
formal treaties, such as the NPT, however, the objectives, the guidelines, and the rules of 
governance are not codified in a treaty and they do not by themselves generate or spur 
new treaties. Responding to a point of clarification from Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kislyak, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
John Bolton said that the text of the PSI “was not carved in stone, but neither should he 
treat it as still being in the word processor.”79 TGNs, therefore, occupy a middle ground 
between international versions of gentleman’s agreements and legally binding 
international documents.   
The final criterion refers to scope. Whereas IGOs have the capacity to 
simultaneously focus on a range of global issues, TGNs tend to be confined to a few 
“narrow issue-specific problems.”80 Many scholars have concluded that the likelihood for 
TGN-based cooperation is greater on highly technical issues which lack political salience, 
as opposed to larger issues of national security which attract considerable political and 
media attention (Keohane 1979; Slaughter 2004; Raustialla 2002). I suggest that although 
some TGNs may tackle highly technical issues, these networks can also be used to 
address issues of high political salience, including challenges relating to international 
security. Technical complexity and political salience are not necessarily inversely 
                                                
79 Bolton, John, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 121. 
80 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2013, p. 8 
 39 
correlated. The qualifying criterion for TGNs is narrow issue-specific scope as opposed 
to high complexity or low political salience. 
 Drawing from the existing literature on TGNs and networks, this set of 14 criteria 
constitutes my threshold for identifying a TGN. It is important to note that not all of the 
criteria detailed here are exclusive to a TGN. Some TGN characteristics clearly over lap 
with IGOs: the requirement of three or more members, the shared preferences, the 
representation of sub-state units, and the narrow issue specific focus. However, these 
features alone do not qualify TGNs. It is only when taken together with other 
characteristics, such as the lack of an HQ or secretariat, an uncodified charter, 
deliberation and consensus as the decision-mode as opposed to formal voting, and the 
absence of a treaty or a formal budget, can an entity be classified as a TGN. From these 
criteria, I now derive six hypotheses about why TGNs like the PSI arise and take the form 
that they do. Many of the widely quoted and generic benefits of TGN-based cooperation, 
such as flexibility, speed, and low transaction costs stem from the characteristics outlined 
above. However, there are additional conditions of TGN-based cooperation, including the 
relationship between power and networked governance and the nature of the issue under 
question, which help to explain why some problems appear to be better suited to TGN 
cooperation than others. Some of the conditions outlined below are necessary but alone 





2.4.2 Conditions for TGN Formation and Cooperation.  
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the formation of TGNs. The purpose of 
this section is to consider the independent variables, that is, the driving factors that 
influence the likelihood of TGN-based cooperation.  
 
H1: TGN-based-cooperation is more likely to occur when there is concentrated 
power within an issue area, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor willing to 
exercise managerial power in a productive way.   
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, concentrated power is an important 
precondition for transgovernmental cooperation. TGNs do not come about organically - 
they are often created and managed by powerful actors with a vested interest in 
exercising issue specific power. The U.S. has traditionally acted as a quasi-imperial 
power, steering TGNs and managing a range of sub-unit stakeholder relationships via soft 
law arrangements. Without a formal monitoring and enforcement mechanism, TGNs have 
relied upon a dominant actor like the U.S. to coordinate discussion and action. While this 
actor is not formally recognised as the focal point of communications, negotiations, and 
deliberations, it is implicitly awarded a managerial status by participant actors, who give 
up a degree of their own organisational agency for two reasons. First, they may have been 
forcibly volunteered to do so in return for a range of participatory incentives, and second, 
the dominant actor may be the only power with the resources to efficiently and 
effectively organise cooperation. Without concentrated power, TGN-based cooperation is 
unlikely to arise or succeed. Successful TGN cooperation requires a degree of confidence 
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regarding compliance by participants, which in turn necessitates the presence of an agent 
with the capabilities to monitor and enforce arrangements. 
 
H2: TGN-based-cooperation favours issues where there are opportunities for 
heterogeneous contracting by the managerial power.  
Heterogeneous contracting implies that “the terms of incorporation between the 
center and each periphery involve different rights and responsibilities.”81 Uniformed 
contracting, on the other hand, implies that “the same set of generalised agreements hold 
between all incorporate political communities.”82 Powerful states, like the U.S., are more 
likely to favour TGN-based cooperation if they can offer individual participants different 
terms of engagement. States may have different motivations for joining and adhering to 
TGN guidelines, and powerful states can use this diversity in their favour. While the 
‘core group’ of states may receive favourable treatment, incentives, or policies, the wider 
network does not necessarily have to receive the same level or type of benefit. Stemming 
from varying terms of engagement, TGN participants may also have differing levels of 
obligations. Referring specifically to the non-proliferation area, Guy B. Roberts, NATO 
Deputy Assistant Secretary General For Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, suggests 
that initiatives usually involve three types of obligations: 
 “Some are active obligations. These initiatives are used to coordinate the 
activities and participation in a given action. There are passive obligations in which 
participants merely accede to an agreement, perhaps publicly proclaiming their 
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support, but they are not generally required to perform any specific function. There 
are also support obligations, in which members agree to provide support such as 
funding, information, training, or equipment.”83 
 
I suggest that even within a particular initiative or TGN, the type of obligations 
that participants are required to fulfil may vary and evolve. Core states may have 
“support obligations” which involve providing funding, information, training, or 
equipment, while others may simply have passive obligations, which stem from the fact 
that they have proclaimed their support to the initiative. If a powerful state requires 
action, then it may call upon a state that has passively lent its support to become an active 
state with active obligations. While IGOs are clearly not devoid of obligations, the shift 
between one type of obligation and another can be considerably harder. TGNs are 
predominantly based on trust and awareness of common enterprise – as the nature and 
demands of this enterprise changes, so might the obligations and terms of engagement. A 
managerial power is more likely to support TGN-based cooperation if they can shape or 
dictate the terms of engagement in a specific issue area. 
 
H3: TGN formation is most likely when there are short time horizons. 
 TGNs can enhance the speed of decision-making and reduce the transaction costs 
of international cooperation for states that share preferences with the dominant state. 
Treaties often take years and sometimes even decades to negotiate and enact. 
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Deliberations around the Nonproliferation Treaty, for instance, began in 1965; however, 
the document did not open for signature until three years later in 1968 and enter into 
force until 1970. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was first proposed in 1967 but 
only received ratification from the senate in 1972. The UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities became the subject of UN debate in 1987; it opened for 
signature twenty years later in 2007, and it was rejected by U.S. Senate five years after 
that. Treaty based regimes are consistently slower and more expensive to implement than 
TGNs, which do not require domestic ratification or a long deliberation process. This is 
not to say that IGO based cooperation has no value. Instead, formal cooperation may 
make more sense if the U.S. anticipates that cooperation over an issue or set of issues will 
endure over time.84 Furthermore, the lack of binding rules in a TGN may leave scope for 
frequent renegotiation of the agreement, which in turn can increase the bargaining costs 
associated with participation.85 However, TGN-based cooperation may be more attractive 
to a managerial state like the U.S. if time horizons are short,86 that is, if the issue under 
question requires a quick response or if there is an assumption that the arrangement will 




                                                




H4: Issue volatility and uncertainty favour TGN-based cooperation.  
A number of political scientists and sociologists have argued that ability of 
networks to adapt quickly to unanticipated environmental changes lends them more to 
addressing issues that are more volatile and unpredictable in nature. IGOs are tied to 
formal rules and structures. Treaties are set in stone and are often extremely cumbersome 
to amend. TGNs, on the other hand, are more sensitive to exogenous shocks. The lack of 
legally binding rules means that they can be changed quickly to suit the required 
circumstances. The Plaza Communiqué and the Louvre Accord, for example, were 
informal arrangements designed to respond to volatile currency movements.  According 
to Anthony Aust, a legal counsellor to Britain’s Foreign Office in 1986, "One of the 
greatest advantages of an informal instrument is the ease with which it can be 
amended."87 Through TGNs, states can avoid having to commit funds and resources to a 
particular bureaucratic structure, if they believe that the issue may be volatile, susceptible 
to exogenous shocks, and require amending in the near future. 
 
H5: TGN-based cooperation is more likely if the issue is susceptible to 
intransigence at the international level.  
One can also expect TGN-based cooperation to occur if the issue area under 
consideration is unlikely to receive quick and extensive cooperation from states working 
through an IGO mechanism. This benefit speaks to two characteristics of TGNs. First, 
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TGNs lack an equity based decision-making structure and second, they tend to arise from 
a small homogenous core of states with shared preferences. Like-minded groups and 
actors that have cooperated on issues in the past may be more likely to share similar 
perceptions of a problem and visions of how to address this problem. If the issue has a 
high level of political salience, states may favour cooperating with smaller groups of sub-
state actors, that are less likely to throw a spanner in the bureaucratic works. 
Furthermore, the lack of an equity based decision-making structure not only allows states 
to avoid the ‘international veto’ problem but it also enables them to bypass potential 
international spoilers without having to develop a comprehensive spoiler management 
strategy. Spoilers are those actors who have a vested interest in derailing the 
deliberations; in essence, they believe that either the discussion process or the result of 
the discussions will threaten their power, worldview, or interests; and will employ 
whatever means necessary and available to undermine the process. Unlike the UN 
Security Council whose operations and decisions can be constrained by the exercise of 
veto power by strong and spoiler states, TGNs do not require unanimous approval from 
their participants. If states do not agree with the guidelines or objectives of the TGN, they 
can simply leave the network or remain without taking supporting action. By cooperating 
with like-minded actors, states can achieve compliance and consensus through direct 
peer-to-peer monitoring and reciprocity,88 while avoiding the challenges posed by veto 
power and potential spoilers.  
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H6: Issue intractability at the domestic level favours TGN-based cooperation.  
Linked to international veto power and the problem of spoiler states is the 
question of domestic hurdles to cooperation. International treaties with legal implications 
for participant states often require formal ratification by domestic legislatures. These 
domestic deliberations are generally subject to public scrutiny. Sometimes the treaties or 
the decision to pursue certain strategies on particular issues can be in keeping with 
domestic public and political opinion. In small arms, for instance, U.S. behaviour in 
pursuit of its goals was in keeping its domestic constituencies, namely, the NRA and 
weapons manufacturers.89 The U.S. used its veto power to blunt a treaty on the subject of 
small arms. In military and security services, on the hand, U.S. behaviour evolved with 
domestic pressures. In the wake of the incidents in Iraq and as a result of Congress 
calling for more regulation, the U.S. began participating in a multi-stakeholder initiative, 
where it employed productive rather than hard power.90 While TGNs are by no means 
free of domestic pressures and influences, they can “pass more easily under the domestic 
political radar screen.”91 Clearly, a state’s behaviour in the pursuit of its goals will still 
reflect its domestic interests. However, given their somewhat secretive nature, TGN-
based-cooperation, at least in the initial stages, can allow cooperation between states to 
go undetected by the domestic political constituency.  
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 The benefits of TGN-based cooperation and the conditions under which TGNs 
may form are linked to the characteristics that qualify an entity as a TGN. The lack of a 
codified charter can enhance the speed of decision-making and reduce the costs of 
cooperation; TGNs can adapt quickly to unanticipated changes, which in turn, lends them 
more to cooperation on issues that are more volatile and unpredictable in nature; TGNs 
lack an equity based decision-making structure and tend to arise from a small core group 
of states that share preferences, which helps powerful states to avoid the international 
veto problem and the question of spoilers; they lack of direct approval from domestic 
constituencies allowing TGNs to reduce domestic-level impediments to cooperation; and 
finally, TGNs allow powerful states to offer participants different terms of engagement 
on the basis of their own preferences and requirements.  
While all six conditions outlined above make TGN-based cooperation more 
likely, we may speculate that they are not all mutually exclusive or equally weighted in 
terms of their influence on TGN formation. Concentrated power in the shape of a 
managerial state is the principal precondition for TGN formation, however, a decision by 
U.S officials to use a TGN will also depend on whether: the relationship is anticipated to 
be one-off or enduring; the issue under question is subject to uncertainty and volatility; 
and/or if formal cooperation is likely to suffer from international intransigence and 
domestic-level impediments. Furthermore, opportunities for heterogeneous contracting 
are biconditional to the existence of a managerial state. The ability to offer participants 
different terms of engagement depends upon the existence of a resource rich actor willing 
to exercise productive power in the first place. Additionally, domestic distributive 
conflict and the existence of domestic veto players are alone unlikely to drive TGN 
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formation. TGN-based cooperation is more likely when states recognise the potential for 
joint gains but disagree over the details of an international agreement.92 This 
disagreement may be informed by domestic level impediments but it does not always 
have to be driven by it. Thus, while all six conditions make TGN-based cooperation more 
likely, they are not all equally weighted or mutually exclusive. 
 This chapter has assessed why TGNs like the PSI arise and take the form that they 
do. I have suggested that when the U.S. decides to work through an IGO as opposed to a 
TGN or vice versa, it conducts an analysis of the utility of that particular organisational 
form. It takes into consideration not only the nature of the issue area under question but 
also how the characteristics of each organisational form lend itself to effective 
cooperation on that specific issue. Both IGOs and TGNs can constrain and shape the 
behaviour of member states, while simultaneously being the object of strategic U.S. 
choice. IGOs and TGNs do not necessarily have to be competitive architectures of 
cooperation within a regime. As demonstrated above, TGNs provide certain benefits that 
IGOs are unable to provide and vice versa. For some issue areas, TGNs may present a 
better institutional design for cooperation than IGOs, while for other areas IGOs may be 
more conductive for cooperation. In the next Chapter, I illustrate the dynamics and 
evolution of TGN formation and cooperation by applying the TGN framework to the 
non-proliferation regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative.  
 
 
                                                




New Initiatives for New Threats: The Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the dynamics and evolution of 
transgovernmental networking using a recent, successful, and in some ways novel 
example of transgovernmental security cooperation, the PSI. While a range of TGNs exist 
within the non-proliferation regime, the PSI is of particular interest to this paper as it 
represents an evolutionary step within the TGN framework. Unlike some of the 
multilateral export controls which function as subsidiaries or supporting mechanisms to 
the existing IGO/treaty structure, the PSI-TGN structure constitutes the political core of 
cooperation over an issue that has yet to be addressed effectively via a treaty. The PSI 
does not simply plug a gap in the existing regime - it acts as a functional substitute for 
IGO/treaty based cooperation over a highly salient issue. 
This Chapter proceeds as follows. First, it briefly discusses how the non-
proliferation regime itself has evolved, tracing its evolution from formal state-oriented 
treaty based arrangements such as the NPT to a range of less formal initiatives including 
multilateral export control efforts and today, the PSI. I examine some of the reasons 
behind why the U.S. initially opted to work through formal instruments of cooperation as 
opposed to informal ones and then moved towards looser networks of cooperation. Next, 
the Chapter focuses specifically on the PSI, using the 14 threshold criteria from Chapter 
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Two to demonstrate how the PSI qualifies as a TGN despite claims by U.S. officials that 
it is an “activity not an organisation.” The PSI is also assessed against the six conditions 
for TGN-based formation and cooperation to illustrate that the decision by U.S. officials 
to cooperate through the PSI-TGN framework was based on a calculation of the 
functional and strategic benefits that it could offer to the U.S. as opposed to a formal 
arrangement. The Chapter ends by demonstrating how and why the PSI constitutes an 
evolutionary step within the TGN framework.  
 
3.1 Evolution of the Non-proliferation Regime   
 
A regime consists of “a set of implicit or explicit norms, principles, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations.”93 Consequently, the non-proliferation regime consists of 
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude regarding the dangers of proliferating WMD to 
states and non-state actors; standards of behaviour defined in terms of obligations not to 
proliferation and entitlements to civil nuclear capabilities; and both formal and informal 
architectures of cooperation for enforcing collective action. There exists an extensive 
body of literature on why states demonstrate nuclear restraint and the factors that explain 
the relatively successful record of nuclear non-proliferation. Variation in organisational 
form, particularly the trend towards transgovernmental networks within the non-
proliferation regime, on the other hand, remains relatively unexamined. There has also 
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been an evolution in the role of TGNs, which demands a closer examination. The 
objective of this Chapter is to trace, assess, and analyse the significance of these changes.    
  
3.1.1 Core Components of the State-Oriented Non-proliferation Regime 
 
The non-proliferation regime is made up of a constellation of elements, including 
international agreements and cooperative actions aimed at curbing the spread of WMD 
and advanced delivery components to states. Since the first tactical use of the atomic 
bomb in Hiroshima in 1945 and evidence of the vastly destructive capabilities of 
nonconventional weapons,94 horizontal WMD proliferation has been a significant concern 
for the U.S. During the Cold War, the non-proliferation regime was predominantly state-
centric and employed as a means of managing superpower nuclear rivalry. By limiting 
the number of states that could acquire nuclear weapons, the U.S. managed the 
destabilising effects that possession of nuclear technologies would have on the bipolar 
system of international states.  
During the past half-century and as a result of the threat of WMD terrorism, the 
U.S has taken a leadership role in building and developing a non-proliferation regime 
centred on the principles of deterrence and containment. Nuclear deterrence entails 
security assurances to nonnuclear states in order to prevent them from acquiring nuclear 
weapons in the future. Negative assurances have included “no first-use” promises in 
which nuclear power states agree not to use nuclear weapons against any of the NPT 
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parties that do not have nuclear weapons (with the exception of one or two).95 Positive 
security assurances, on the other hand, include promises by nuclear states to seek UN 
Security Council protection for nonnuclear states in the event that an enemy threatens 
nonnuclear states with nuclear attack.96 The principle of nuclear containment is intended 
to prevent states that already posses nuclear weapons from proliferating knowledge or 
weapons to nonnuclear states.  
The foundation of each of the three major components of the non-proliferation 
regime (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) is an almost universally accepted 
treaty: the NPT, which opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1972; the 
BWC, which opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975; and the CWC, 
which opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997.97 The treaties and 
formal agreements that make up the regime often include “inspection provisions, to 
verify states’ compliance with the treaty’s most important provisions, and associated 
export control systems.”98  
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The NPT constitutes a legally binding treaty that includes an extensive inspection 
system to verify that civil nuclear facilities are not being used and abused for the purpose 
of weaponisation. Discussions surrounding a potential non-proliferation treaty originally 
began in 1959 and received unanimous approval in the form of a 1961 resolution of the 
UN General Assembly. Proposed by Ireland and revised by the General Assembly, this 
resolution called for a treaty under which nuclear powers “would undertake to refrain 
from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information for 
their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons.”99 As a result of Cold War 
disagreements and tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it took until 1968 to 
negotiate and produce a final treaty draft. The treaty was eventually signed by 62 
countries including the “P-5,” which were the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council and the only countries permitted to have nuclear weapons among those that 
joined, namely, the U.S. the Soviet Union, France, China, and the United Kingdom.  
With a few notable exceptions, this regime has gained almost universal support, 
and it has “gradually created a deeply etched norm against the acquisition and use of 
WMD.”100 Broad support, however, does not always translate into success. A number of 
key nuclear states remain outside of the non-proliferation regime or have continued to 
acquire technologies that would allow them to develop nuclear weapons. Notable 
examples include India and Pakistan, who declared themselves to be nuclear weapon 
states in 1998; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), who tested a nuclear 
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device and claims to have a weapon in 2006; Iran, who is believed by many to have 
developed a nuclear weapons program; and Israel, who is suspected to have possessed 
nuclear weapons for some decades now.101  
In terms of a formal structure, as of 2013, 189 states are recognised to be party to 
the NPT and the treaty itself relies upon the IAEA as an institutionalised mechanism for 
monitoring and setting standards. The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria; its 
personnel includes a team of 2,300 multi-disciplinary professionals and support staff 
drawn from more than 100 countries; programmes and budgets are set by the 35-member 
Board of Governors and the General Conference of all Member States; and annual 
regular budget is set by the General Conference. Both the NPT and the IAEA reflect the 
state-centric formalised nature of cooperation that characterised the nuclear non-
proliferation regime until recently.   
The BWC is a politically binding international treaty that was signed by 171 
states in 1972 and of those, it has been ratified by 155 states today. It explicitly outlaws 
the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons in order to 
exclude completely the possibility that they could be used against human beings, other 
animals, or plants. Unlike the NPT, the BWC does not distinguish between the “have” 
and “have not” states. It builds upon other renunciations of the use of biological weapons, 
including the 1954 Brussels Treaty, the unilateral renunciation by the U.S. in 1954, and 
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France in 1972.102 While the treaty is politically binding, it lacks specific monitoring, 
accounting, or even enforcement provisions that are today thought to be essential 
components of a treaty. Neither does it have the provisions of an international 
organisation “for assisting states parties to discharge their obligations.”103 Reports of 
gross violations by the USSR and Iraq led to negotiations for a legally binding 
verification and compliance-promoting instrument that would strengthen the BWC in 
1995. However, these negotiations collapsed in 2001 and the BWC remains a treaty 
without teeth. 
Finally, the 1993 CWC prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of 
chemical weapons, and requires signatories to participate in a verification system and to 
institute domestic compliance-assuring measures. The treaty has now been ratified by 188 
member states. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was 
established as a result of a treaty provision; it has a secretariat based at the Hague; a 
trained international inspectorate of 150-200 that is independent of the member states; an 
Executive Council consisting of 41 members elected by the Conference of the States 
Parties; a plenary organ which has the power to oversee the implementation of the 
Convention; codified rules of procedure; and a routinely identified and regularly 
available budget, which is independent of any one member state.  
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The NPT, BWC, and CWC are all core components of the formal state-oriented 
non-proliferation regime. Other formal components include the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (LTBT), which prohibits nuclear testing everywhere but underground; the 1974 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty 
(PNET) which prohibit the testing of weapons underground if their explosive yield 
exceeds 150 kilotons; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for 
signature in 1996 but is yet to enter into force; and the five nuclear-weapon free zone 
(NWFZ) treaties which cover Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Central Asia, the 
South Pacific, and Southeast Asia and under which regional states reiterate their pledge in 
the NPT not to develop nuclear weapons. Each of these regime components plays a vital 
role in regulating, monitoring, and enforcing the non-proliferation norm.  
Why did states choose to work through the formal instruments of cooperation as 
opposed to informal ones? First, the primary targets of these regulatory efforts are states. 
During the Cold War, the U.S. was concerned about the spread of nuclear technologies to 
Soviet allied states, whose acquisition and development of weaponised nuclear 
technologies could precipitate a change in the balance of power. By establishing legally 
and politically binding prohibitions, states would not only have to deal with the 
repercussions of proliferating knowledge and weapons but also punishments for receiving 
technologies from proliferators.  
Second, while informal cooperation relies upon each participant to implement and 
enforce the agreement in accordance with domestic laws and practices, treaties often 
come with international verification systems, inspection agencies, and enforcement 
mechanisms. The IAEA, for instance, can refer countries to the UN Security Council (as 
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it did for North Korea in 1994 and Iran in 2006); OPCW members can take collective 
measures against proliferating or receiving states or refer states to the UN Security 
Council; and states party to the BWC can lodge complaints with the UN Security Council 
if they suspect that a state has broken its treaty obligations.  
Third, treaty based cooperation can be accompanied by incentives which are 
offered to all parties on an equal non-discriminatory basis. The CWC and the BWC, for 
instance, offer signatory states access to peaceful chemical and biotechnology so long as 
they are used for peaceful purposes. They also offer assistance to victims of a chemical or 
biological attack. The NPT offers positive and negative security assurances from nuclear 
states to nonnuclear states in the event of a threat of attack from another nuclear state. 
States can also negotiate on the basis of aid for civil nuclear energy, as long as they can 
demonstrate that their programmes are being used for peaceful purposes. This may be 
more attractive to signatories as they are all explicitly made aware of the terms of 
engagement when they sign up. Finally, unlike TGNs, which are generally ad hoc in 
nature, treaties are intended to be instruments with longer-lasting implications for 
signatory states. While not explicitly prohibited, treaty denunciations and withdrawals are 
often frowned upon and send a powerful signal of non-compliance. Of course, there are a 
number of examples of countries withdrawing from treaties. In 2001 President Bush 
withdrew from the 1971 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty after almost 30 years of 
being party to it. The U.S. withdrew on the premise that the ABM hindered its ability to 
develop ways to protect its citizens from terrorists or rogue state missile attacks. The 
nature of the threat had changed, thus, the U.S. no longer felt that the ABM provided an 
adequate mechanism for dealing with the new threat. However, the decision to pull out 
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from the treaty was not without fierce political debate within Washington and around the 
world. Two days prior to U.S. withdrawal, 31 House of Representative members 
registered their opposition to pulling out of the treaty, arguing that President Bush could 
not act alone. There was also opposition around the world, with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin calling the decision to abandon the treaty a “mistake.”104 Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin expressed the greatest concern over U.S. withdrawal, and stated 
that he “looked forward to further high-level dialogue on the topic.”105 Withdrawal from 
an internationally accepted treaty thus is not an easy process. While sometimes desirable 
or necessary, treaties are intended to be lasting architectures of cooperation. 
While treaties and IGOs lie at the core of the non-proliferation regime, TGNs like 
the multilateral export control initiatives have also played an important role in supporting 
the traditional state-centric framework. It would be factually inaccurate to suggest that 
TGNs are an entirely new feature of the non-proliferation regime, gaining prominence 
only after the fall of the Soviet Union and the events of 9/11. TGNs have played in a 
critical role in supporting treaties such as the NPT, CWC, and BWC for a number of 
years. They provide technical assistance, plug gaps, and set standards. While the final 
section of this chapter will address the evolution of TGNs in greater detail, it is worth at 
this point detailing the type and role of TGNs that existed prior to the PSI and as 
subsidiaries to the existing regime.  
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Since the 1970s and in response to the growing number of states capable of 
supplying equipment, material, or technology needed for the production of WMD, groups 
of supplier states have come together to establish informal TGNs that reinforce and 
expand the national export controls required by the non-proliferation treaties.106 These 
networks include the NSG, which was founded in 1976 and includes 45 member states; 
the AG, which was founded in 1985 and has gained support from 41 member states; and 
the MTCR, which was founded in 1987 and has 34 partners. The NSG covers transfers 
relating to nuclear materials, the AG covers chemical and biological related transfers, and 
the MTCR was established to limit the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles. Other 
export control initiatives include the NEP (Zangger Committee), which stems from the 
NPT and the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was founded in 1996 and has 41 
participating states. The Zangger Committee concerns safeguards on nuclear exports, 
while the Wassenaar Arrangement focuses on transfers in conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies.  
The purpose of these supplier networks is to develop and maintain guidelines for 
national export controls, “including general standards for issuing export licenses and 
“core lists” of controlled items that might contribute to the manufacture of the respective 
WMD and advanced deliver systems.”107 They support the existing structure by plugging 
regulatory gaps and setting standards. As Spector notes, these supplier organisations have 
developed informal rules regarding the admission of new members, including, the 
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requirement that new members have to be in good standing with existing state-oriented 
treaties like the NPT, CWC, or BWC.108 Countries outside of these groups have 
complained that these arrangements are discriminatory as they restrict their rights to have 
access to peaceful nuclear, chemical, and biological technology.109 While these supplier 
groups meet the TGN criteria, they are nonetheless, closely tied to the state-centric non-
proliferation regime.  
 
Diagram (A): TGNs in the Traditional Non-proliferation Regime 
 
Diagram A above illustrates the position of TGNs within the traditional state-
centric non-proliferation regime. The core component of this regime is a set of widely 
adopted international treaties. These treaties are supported, enforced, and monitored by 
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IGOs. TGNs like the multilateral export and supplier groups, in this model are auxiliary 
components. While they do not have a formal treaty basis, they are nonetheless closely 
affiliated with the treaty/IGO regime – plugging technical and regulatory gaps that the 
existing structure is unable to effectively address. As the next section will demonstrate, 
TGNs within the non-proliferation regime have evolved to become sources of decision-
making within themselves - independent of the existing structure. 
 
3.1.2 New Regime Components to Meet New Threats  
 
Many have raised doubts about the viability of Cold War-era regulatory 
instruments to effectively combat the spread of WMD to state and non-state actors. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the wake of September 11 2001 
attacks, the U.S. has reoriented its non-proliferation policy to target non-state actors 
particularly terrorist groups and rogue states supplying weapons to terrorist networks. 
Guy B. Roberts argues that today, the U.S and its allies face a considerably more 
complicated, diffuse, rapidly changing, multifaceted, and threatening security 
environment than the Cold War nuclear confrontation.110 During the Cold War, non-
proliferation treaties were strictly a state-to-state endeavour. Agreements were negotiated 
by states, approved by state legislatures and implemented by instruments of state 
power.111 Today “nations that clandestinely seek WMD also are the same countries that 
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support terrorist groups.”112 Of particular concern are those terrorist groups who are 
sponsored or funded by states and who lack a geographic home, infrastructure or 
identifiable population that can be threatened.113 How do you craft an effective deterrence 
strategy if you do not know whom, what, and where your strategy should be directed? 
The discovery of the nuclear weapons related trafficking network the A.Q Khan network 
has provided considerable evidence to support the assertion that there exist other 
organisations that are actively pursuing WMD. Roberts refers to the network of these 
actors as the ‘secondary proliferation market,’ which exists beyond the scope of 
traditional arms control treaties, directed primarily at states.114  
The chosen vehicle for implementing this new policy is not a formal IGO or a 
treaty; rather, it is increasingly a flexible and decentralised transgovernmental network. 
While non-proliferation treaties and agreements still enjoy near-universal compliance, the 
remote possibility of WMD terrorism has forced states to cooperate through looser and 
easily adaptable arrangements that are deemed to be more suitable to today’s diverse and 
unpredictable threats.  
As Diagram B illustrates, TGNs are no longer just a subsidiary component to the 
existing treaty/IGO structure. TGNs like the PSI have evolved to a stage where they, in 
and of themselves, constitute the political core of cooperation. These new TGNs work 
alongside the traditional state-centric regime to create a network of networks. They are 
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also supported by and have given birth to a number of other TGNs like the CSI and the 
SFI, which interact with the wider non-proliferation regime. Having discussed the state-
oriented components of the non-proliferation regime and the trend towards non-state 
actors and looser cooperative arrangements, I now turn to the PSI as a case study of 
successful transgovernmental security networking and cooperation.  
 








3.2 Case Study: The Proliferation Security Initiative  
 
Launched by President George W. Bush at the G-8 meeting in Krakow, Poland on 
May 31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is now in its tenth year of 
operation. Announcing its launch, President Bush said:  
“When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we 
must have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new 










States and a number of our close allies, including, Poland, have begun working on 
new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize 
illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this 
partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons 
away from our shores and out of the hands of common enemies.”115    
 
U.S. involvement in the initiative was bold and timely. It stemmed from an 
incident with a North Korean vessel known as the So San. On December 9, 2002, U.S. 
and Spanish naval forces interdicted a vessel heading to Yemen in the Arabian Sea. It is 
reported that the U.S. had intelligence that this vessel was carrying cargo related to Scud 
ballistic missiles. Although the ship originated from North Korea, it was not flying under 
a North Korean flag. Neither was there a ship under the name of So San in the North 
Korean registry. Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the vessel 
was stateless and thus subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high 
seas.116 UNCLOS states that interdiction is permissible where reasonable grounds exist to 
suspect a ship of statelessness, engaging in slave trade, shipping narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances, committing unauthorised broadcasting, or piracy.117 The 
statelessness of the So San and the belief that the ship was carrying WMD cargo was 
thought to justify the U.S. and Spain taking interdictory action.  As soon as the ship 
reached the waters patrolled by a pre-existing Combined Task Force (CTF), the U.S. 
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Navy asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the vessel. The vessel’s captain refused 
to stop and allow the Spanish navy to board the vessel, as a result of which, Spanish 
Naval personnel forcibly boarded the ship by helicopter. U.S. Naval personnel joined 
soon after. The So San’s manifest stated that the cargo contained bags of cement but 
underneath those bags of cement lay a proliferation cargo of 15 Scud missiles, 15 
conventional warheads, 23 containers of nitric acid fuel, and 85 barrels of initially 
unidentified chemical, later described as an oxidizer for the missile fuel.118  
On December 11, this example of successful interdiction and intelligence sharing 
turned to failure. The U.S. had no legal basis for retaining the cargo. As the interdiction 
became public and received media attention, U.S. officials were forced to release the 
vessel and to allow the ship to resume safe passage to Yemen. Despite a commitment by 
the government of Yemen that it was not going to purchase any more Scud missiles from 
North Korea, the Yemeni President, on December 10, complained that the missiles, 
warheads, and fuel were Yemen’s property and that the So San should be allowed to 
proceed to Yemen without interruption.119 Former U.S. Government officials believe that 
had details of the interdiction remained secret, the Yemeni government would have 
accepted the interdiction and the cargo would have remained in the hands of the U.S.120 
However, upon release of details surrounding the incident, it became politically 
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unfeasible for the Yemeni government to accept the seizure of their property by U.S. and 
Spanish officials.121  
In a statement announcing the release of the So San, White House Press Secretary 
Ari Fleischer noted:   
“There is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from 
accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea. While there is authority to stop 
and search, in this instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of 
Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen. And therefore, the merchant vessel is 
being released. 
... 
One thing that this does underscore is the need to take a look-and we will 
do so, with friends and others around the world-in a diplomatic sense about 
whether or not the international regimes that deal with missile proliferation need a 
second look.”122 
 
Coincidentally, on the same day that details of the So San incident were released, 
the U.S. government also published its 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, which placed an increased emphasis on managing the consequences of 
WMD use and combating proliferation once it already occurred.123 As Koch notes, this 
publication departed from earlier declaratory policy by addressing policies and actions to 
counter proliferation before addressing ones to prevent it.124 The 2002 National Strategy 
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that: 
“We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in 
preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and 
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terrorists. Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess 
the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by 
states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends, and 
allies.”125 
 
Growing awareness of the dangers of WMD proliferation during the 1990s and 
after the fall of the Soviet Union became a profound concern following the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. anthrax attacks of fall 2001. These events not only 
highlighted the power and capabilities of non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda but also the 
growing reach of and interconnectedness of terrorist organisations with criminal 
networks. In recent years, for the right price, black-market operatives, such as the A.Q. 
Khan network have been willing to use their knowledge and personal connections to 
provide terrorist organisations with delivery systems through which to transit WMD and 
related materials.126 Although WMD were not used in 9/11 attacks and anthrax attacks of 
fall 2001 were unsuccessful, they did provide overwhelming evidence in support of the 
claim that terrorist groups were actively pursuing WMD and that if they acquired such 
capabilities, they would readily use them.127 Moreover, the terrorist groups and criminal 
networks discussed here are beyond the scope of traditional arms control treaties and 
export control TGNs, which are directed primarily towards state actors. At the time, there 
were few, if any provisions in the non-proliferation legal framework addressing the threat 
posed by nonstate actors. In recognition of this lacuna within the existing non-
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proliferation regime, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction highlighted the need for an effective interdiction mechanism in order to 
prevent to movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and 
terrorist organisations.128 From the U.S. perspective, the PSI would act as an important 
tool in the international effort to break-up black-markets and to detect and intercept 
WMD materials in transit.  
The Obama administration continued to demonstrate a commitment to the PSI. 
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report reaffirmed President Obama’s pledge to make 
the PSI “a durable international institution” through which countries could “coordinate, 
share intelligence, and build capacity to interdict WMD related transfers.”129 According 
to the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the PSI provides committed states with a 
“framework for coordinating counterproliferation activities to thwart proliferators’ 
increasingly sophisticated tactics.”130 Unlike traditional formal organisations, the PSI 
does not necessitate the creation of new laws or regulations: the interdictions are carried 
out under existing national regulations. The precise number of desired, attempted, and 
successful interdictions through the PSI is shrouded in operational secrecy. However, in 
July 2006, Under Secretary Robert Joseph said that PSI had “played a key role in helping 
to interdict more than 30 shipments,”131 and it had been credited with successfully 
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interdicting WMD parts to Iran and publicly exposing the A.Q. Khan network and 
Libya’s WMD program.132   
In press statements, U.S. public officials are keen to remind participant states that 
the PSI constitutes an activity and not an organisation. The initiative’s efforts are not 
aimed at one country but instead at halting the global traffic in proliferation related items. 
There is no formal treaty or decision-making mechanism and no governing body, 
headquarters, or membership application. Members are referred to as “participants” and 
membership as “endorsement.” The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP) is not a 
formal treaty; rather, it represents a political commitment to establish best practices to 
tackle proliferation.133 Yet the defining characteristics of the PSI fit the criteria for a 
TGN. While the PSI is not an organisation in the formal sense, it nonetheless constitutes 
an informal architecture of cooperation. The next section will assess the PSI against the 
14 TGN threshold criteria outlined in Chapter Two, with the objective of demonstrating 
that the PSI not only constitutes a TGN but it also represents an evolution in the TGN 
framework. The Chapter will then examine the PSI in relation to the six conditions for 
TGN-based formation and cooperation as a means of outlining the functional and 
strategic benefits that the PSI-TGN could offer the U.S as opposed to a more formal 
structure. 
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3.2.1 The PSI as a Transgovernmental Network  
1. Membership Base 
The membership criterion for a TGN refers to the number of states in the network, 
whether these states share preferences, the type of actors participating, and whom these 
actors represent. The PSI was the brainchild of a number of mid-level U.S. government 
officials. The task to analyse the implications of the So San case was given to an 
Interdiction Sub-Policy Coordinating Committee (Sub-PCC), chaired by Brendan Melley, 
Director for Proliferation Strategy on the NSC staff. A number of agencies, including the 
U.S. DOS, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Departments of Treasury (DOT), Department of Justice 
(DOJ), and Department of Commerce (DOC), and the DHS worked closely to analyse the 
events surrounding the interdiction. Once the analysis had been completed, the Sub-PCC 
began drafting the proposed PSI rules of interdiction, which were then approved by the 
Proliferation Strategy PCC.  
The NSC staff invited eight like-minded liberal democratic governments to join the 
PSI. These governments were also members of the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, 
specifically, Australia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom.134 To this list of eight countries, President Bush added two more: 
France and Germany. These two countries had a pre-existing relationship with the U.S. 
on proliferation issues.135 This group of 11 states came to be known as the PSI “Core 
Group.” Most of these countries were longstanding allies. As Koch notes,  
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“9 were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, 6 were in the G-8, 
and 8 were in the European Union (EU). Of the non-NATO members, Australia had 
long and close alliance ties with the United Kingdom and the United States, and 
Japan with the United States.” 
 
The shared preferences, objectives, and familiarity allowed this set of proliferation 
experts to work quickly and effectively to translate the PSI draft proposals into reality. 
The first meeting took place in Madrid on June 12, 2003 – this was less than two weeks 
after President Bush’s PSI announcement in Krakow and less than 6 months after the So 
San events. Once the core group had agreed on the SIP, John Bolton, Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security contacted the Russian and Chinese 
governments. While the Russian government accepted the invitation for participation, the 
Chinese government did not. By Spring 2004, the Core Group had expanded to 15 states, 
with the addition of Canada, Norway, Singapore, and Russia. This would be the last time 
that they would meet as a Core Group. By March 2004, the number of participants grew 
to over 60; by June 2006 membership stood at over 75; by May 2008 it was at 91; by 
September 2010 membership was at 98 states; and by April 2013, it was 102 (see 
appendix for a list of PSI participants). The PSI began as a core group of like-minded 
states that worked closely to draft policies and set agendas. Once the basic rules of 
interdiction had been agreed upon, membership was extended to a wider participant base.   
With regards to the type of actors and whom these actors represent, the PSI is strictly 
a sub-state affair. The initiative is populated by experts as opposed to generalist 
diplomats or heads of state. Initially, representatives included individuals like William 
Ehrman, Director General for Defence and Intelligence in the United Kingdom Foreign 
Office, who had a long been engaged in countering WMD and missile proliferation. 
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During negotiations, Ehrman also lead a small group of U.S. and UK officials who were 
working to counter the A.Q Khan nuclear proliferation network.136 Stanislas de 
Laboulaye, Deputy Secretary General, Director General of Political Affairs and Security 
in the French Foreign Ministry was also closely involved in counterproliferation efforts, 
particularly regarding Iran. Today, the PSI has become an even more specialised 
endeavour with diplomatic, military, law enforcement, legal, and intelligence experts 
meeting on a regular basis to exchange information and conduct training exercises. 
Although PSI participants have held meetings with IGOs such as NATO, the World 
Health Organization (WHO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO), there 
remains work to be done in this area.137 At present, IGOs and NGOs have little 
involvement in this initiative. Thus, the PSI meets all four criteria under the membership 
sub-heading: it initially began as a core group of like minded states; membership was 
later expanded to the wider community; the participant base constitutes mid-level 
officials and experts (sub-state units); and membership has been limited to state 
representatives as opposed or NGOs or IGOs.  
 
2. Rules of Governance 
Under the heading rules of governance fall five specific threshold criteria relating to 
the HQ/secretariat, staffing presence, staffing independence, meetings and the decision-
mode of a TGN. Unlike an IGO, the PSI lacks a codified charter outlining its objective 
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and organisational structure. The crux of the PSI lies in the 2003 SIP, which identifies 
vague steps that participants should take to effectively interdict shipments carrying WMD 
or related materials, “consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international 
law and frameworks.”138 When participants extend support to the PSI, they endorse the 
broad principles outlined below: 
• Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for 
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern; 
• Share information about suspect proliferation activity and dedicate appropriate 
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities; 
• Strengthen national legal authorities and international legal frameworks to 
support the initiative’s commitments; and   
• Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts, including, not 
transporting or assisting in the transport of any such cargoes; taking action to 
board and search any vessel flying their flag; and seriously considering 
providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and 
searching of its own flag vessels by other states; 
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The initiative is promoted as a channel for land, air, and sea interdiction cooperation 
outside of treaties and multilateral export control regimes.139 It is a pro-active 
enforcement mechanism to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons. As a voluntary organisation without a codified charter or rules of governance, 
the PSI avoids some of the pitfalls of existing counter-proliferation efforts, which have 
included prolonged periods of inactivity due to potential bureaucratic hurdles. There is no 
PSI HQ or secretariat. There is a small central mechanism to help coordinate the 
Initiative’s activities. However, this mechanism is attached to the United States. During 
the May 2009 Global and Western Hemisphere Operational Experts Group (OEG) and 
Outreach Meeting, the U.S. proposed the designation of a PSI focal point.140 In 
November 2010, this proposal was formally adopted by the OEG in Tokyo. The U.S. now 
acts as a central administrative point of contact for disseminating documents, agendas, 
and schedules. Unlike a formal IGO, where the staff is independent of a particular 
country, PSI’s personnel are drawn from and are part of the U.S. government. 
With regards to meetings and decision-mode, there is no formal agreement as to when 
participants should meet and how decisions should be made. In the year that followed the 
official launch of the PSI, the Core Group met on five separate occasions and in five 
different cities - Madrid, Brisbane, Paris, London, and Lisbon. As the number of 
participants grew, the frequency of their meetings declined. PSI participants met in 
Krakow in June 2004, Warsaw in June 2006, and Washington in May 2008. Meetings 
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with all PSI participants have become symbolic and ceremonial affairs as opposed to 
meaningful sources of political deliberation.  
The only regular PSI meetings are those held by the OEG. This group includes 
military, intelligence, law enforcement, legal, and diplomatic experts who work together 
to translate the SIP into action. When the OEG was first established, it met three to five 
times in a plenary, with additional regional meetings and workshops.141 Recent meetings 
were held in Tokyo in November 2010, Hawaii in June 2011, Berlin in November 2011, 
and Seoul in September 2012. Decisions at these meetings are made on the basis of 
deliberation and consensus. On the other hand, the SIP was drafted unilaterally by the 
United States. Bolton told members that the statement could evolve over time and that 
they had the opportunity to submit revisions and drafts.142 However, as the managing 
power, the U.S. would have the ability to oppose any changes to the statement. The PSI 
thus meets the TGN rules of governance criteria. It has no HQ/secretariat; the staff are 
attached to a particular country; meetings are regularised, however they are not specified; 
and there is no formal decision-making structure - decisions are either made unilaterally 
by the managing power or by deliberation and consensus.   
 
3. Budget  
The TGN budget criterion refers to the amount of funding the entity receives, the 
mechanism for the provision of this funding, and the source. Unlike an IGO that must 
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have sufficient funds to cover minimal staffing and operation, a funding mechanism that 
is routinely identified and regularly available, and a source that is not controlled by 
another IGO or one state, the PSI has none of the above. The PSI has an unspecified 
budget, an unspecified funding mechanism, and a source that is controlled predominantly 
by one state – the United States. The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) report 
on the PSI notes that funds for PSI activities remain in large part a component of other 
U.S. programmes that address WMD proliferation and interdiction – the PSI does not 
have separate budget lines.143 While the DOD includes a breakdown of costs exclusively 
dedicated to the PSI in its annual report to Congress, there are other DOD programmes 
which also contribute to PSI efforts but are not included under the PSI umbrella. For 
example, the U.S. Strategic Command budgets for combatant commanders’ participation 
in WMD interdiction exercises are not included in its report to Congress.144 In addition, 
the State Department’s FY2012 and FY2013 congressional budget stated that the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) could be used to support exercises such 
as the PSI, while U.S. staff travel to PSI meetings would be drawn the DOS’s general 
operating accounts.145 The CRS report notes further that participation by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is funded on an ad hoc basis.146 The Department of 
Energy’s (DOE) budget includes funds for National Laboratory research on WMD 
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interdiction technologies, which would also contribute to PSI efforts.147  While 
participant states may have their own domestic budget lines, the PSI lacks a pooled 
budget or funding mechanism. The U.S coordinates and bankrolls the majority of PSI 
excises, while the individual participants cover their individual delegation’s expenditures. 
 
4. Legal Basis 
While most IGOs have a treaty basis, the PSI was not established through a legally 
binding treaty. As Durkalec notes, “a blueprint of the PSI’s activities and a clarification 
of what it means to be a PSI partner were included in the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SIP).”148 However, the initiative itself was not derived from a treaty. It began 
as a political understanding between the U.S. and likeminded allies and then expanded to 
include a range of other countries. Although the PSI exists alongside treaties such as the 
NPT, the BWC and the CWC, it is not directly connected or derived from them. Many 
have suggested that while the PSI does not have a legal basis, it is nonetheless intended 
“to be an embryo of a new legal regime.”149 Lobsinger, for instance, argues that the PSI’s 
SIP laid the foundation for the Security Council Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004.150 
This Resolution calls for all states to: (1) refrain from providing support to nonstates 
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seeking WMD; (2) adopt laws prohibiting nonstate actors from acquiring WMD; and, (3) 
take measures to prevent proliferation.151 Resolution 1540 is ambitious in its scope, as it 
requires all states to pass domestic legislation to support its objectives. While it does not 
directly refer to the PSI, the Resolution originated in a proposal that was made by 
President Bush to the General Assembly in September 2003. In this proposal, Bush 
discussed the PSI and called upon the Security Council to “adopt a new anti-proliferation 
resolution…[that would] call on all members of the U.N. to criminalise the proliferation 
of weapons – WMD.”152 So while the PSI was not established through a legally binding 
treaty, it laid the foundations for a range of other legally and politically binding 
agreements. 
 
5. Scope  
Whereas IGOs may have the capacity to simultaneously address a range of global 
issues, TGNs tend to be confined to a few select, narrow, issue-specific problems. These 
do not necessarily have to be highly complex issues with low political salience. The PSI 
was formed to deal with an issue that was both technical in nature and of high political 
salience. While non-proliferation norms concerning the spread of WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related materials command almost universal support, norms regarding 
interdiction of ships and vessels on the high seas are far more controversial and 
politically salient, as was illustrated by the So San case. As a U.S-promoted initiative 
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with enduring concerns regarding its legitimacy and legality, the PSI has failed to garner 
endorsement from key states, including India, Pakistan, China, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
For instance, many have suggested that countries like India have been deterred from 
joining the PSI as a result of the initiative’s weak legal basis and the absence of UN 
oversight. One important legal stumbling block for India’s participation in the PSI is the 
discriminatory distinction between NPT and non-NPT states in Article 3 bis of the 2005 
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). This Protocol criminalises and requires the 
prohibition of transport of any biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon or related 
materials intended to be used in a nuclear activity not under IAEA Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement.153 India is not a party to the NPT, and thus as Thomas notes, 
“carrying of any BCN weapon or its technology by a ship registered in India will be a 
crime and the same cargo, if carried by a US-registered ship to India will not be a 
crime.”154 A further concern is whether the PSI infringes on the right to innocent passage 
as outlined in UNCLOS. While there exist no official documents stating so, India’s 
concerns also supposedly stem from its NPT status as a non-signatory state, and its 
maltreatment at the hands of the Nuclear Suppliers Group after the 1974 Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosion and the 1998 nuclear tests.155 Joining the PSI, the de facto 
enforcement arm of a system that is perceived to have unjustly targeted India in the past 
                                                
153 The Protocol of 2005 to the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation,’ International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties, IMO, Leg/Conf. 
15/21, November 1, 2005 
154 Thomas, 2009 
155 Holmes, James, 'India and the Proliferation Security Initiative: A U.S Perspective,' Strategic Analysis, 
2007, Vol. 30 (2), pp. 315-337, p. 328 
 80 
is politically unpalatable for India’s leadership. Thus, the scope of the PSI while technical 
and narrow is still politically salient.  
The above discussion has demonstrated that despite adamant claims by U.S. 
government officials that the PSI constitutes an activity, not an organisation, this 
initiative clearly meets the TGN threshold criteria outlined in Chapter Two. It also 
provides a case study of transgovernmental networking within international security, a 
policy area that is traditionally dominated by executive level formal cooperation. In the 
next section, I use the elements outlined above to provide an analysis of the drivers of 
PSI formation and cooperation.  
 
3.2.2 Drivers of PSI Formation & Cooperation 
 
In Chapter Two, I outlined six hypotheses about why TGNs arise and take the 
form that they do. I argued that while widely quoted and generic benefits of TGN-based 
cooperation such as flexibility, speed, and low transaction costs are important, they are 
not the only factors that explain why TGNs arise. There are additional conditions for 
TGN-based cooperation, including the relationship between power and networked 
governance and the nature of the issue under question. I will now examine these 






 H1: TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur when there is concentrated 
power within an issue area, that is, the presence of a resource rich actor willing to 
exercise managerial power in a productive way.   
Concentrated power was a critical factor in driving PSI formation and in 
sustaining TGN-based cooperation. Given the leadership role that the U.S. has played in 
shaping non-proliferation policy over the last half-century, its wide ranging naval 
capabilities, the events of 9/11 and the intersection between radicalisation, criminal 
networks, and technology, as well as the embarrassment generated by the So San 
incident, the Bush administration placed great priority on cultivating a new mechanism 
for cooperation that could prevent such failures in the future. From the very outset, the 
U.S. assumed the role of a quasi-imperial manager - setting agendas, directing 
negotiations, and coordinating action. It was U.S. officials that were tasked with 
analysing the lessons learnt from the So San case and drafting a Statement of Interdiction 
Proposals; it was the U.S. NSC that identified the governments to be invited to implement 
the PSI proposal; it was Bolton and Melley who attended all Core Group meetings and 
had responsibility for keeping tabs on the draft rules of the road and reporting cables; and 
it was President Bush who announced the launch of the PSI in Krakow as opposed to the 
head of state of another country. While the U.S engaged with a range of stakeholders via 
soft law arrangements, it also used versions of hegemonic power to steer the PSI in a 
direction that best suited its objectives. For example, during the first day of the Paris 
meeting in September 2003, Bolton informed governments that if they were not yet ready 
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to endorse the SIP, the United States would take their names off the list.156 Despite some 
reservations, all Core Group members endorsed the SIP. According to an interview Susan 
Koch conducted with Melley, Bolton’s approach that day constituted “a blustery, high-
handed move that worked.”157 
More recently, the U.S. has bankrolled and managed the PSI, leading a number of 
interdiction exercises. In June 2011, the OEG also approved a U.S. proposal to undertake 
a Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) initiative. In describing this initiative, the U.S. 
DOS said:  
“OEG Countries who volunteer to participate in the CCP effort will do so 
by identifying and sharing tools and resources that support interdiction related 
activities and by conducting events in a coordinated manner to develop, 
implement, and exercise CCPs.”158  
 
The CCP will reportedly span across a range of interdiction related requirements, 
including legal frameworks, identification and inspection, seizure and disposal and rapid 
decision-making.159 By launching initiatives such as the CCP and by funding PSI 
exercises, the U.S. has ensured that it remains the focal point of this TGN. Without the 
U.S. exercising concentrated yet productive managerial power, it is unlikely that the PSI 
would have come about or remained active. 
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H2: TGN-based cooperation favours issues where there are opportunities for 
heterogeneous contracting by the managerial power.  
Bi-conditional to the existence of a resource-rich actor willing to exercise 
productive managerial power is the presence of opportunities for heterogeneous 
contracting by this power. Powerful actors like the U.S. are more likely to favour TGN-
based cooperation if they are not obligated to offer participants the same terms of 
engagement. At the same time, these participants may have different motivations for 
participating in the TGN. The PSI is no exception. The NSC staff selected players that 
had close ties to the U.S and that were likely to support U.S. efforts on interdiction 
despite the potential domestic and international political costs to their government. The 
initial eight Core Group members were all part of the coalition of the willing in Iraq and 
had publicly committed to countering proliferation in the name of combating terrorism. 
For instance, the day after 9/11, the U.S invoked the principle of Article 5, that is, the 
NATO self-defence charter, which states that if one member state is under attack, all 
other member nations are to come to its defence.160 Seven of the initial eight Core Group 
were NATO members had supported the invocation of Article 5. Although France and 
Germany were also NATO members and backed the use of Article 5 in 2001, by 2003 
they actively disagreed with the U.S. on the subject of intervention in Iraq. The U.S. used 
this as an opportunity for France and Germany to demonstrate that the two countries were 
still willing partners in the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation. The move to 
include France and Germany was as much a functional necessity given their material 
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capabilities, as it was a test - an opportunity for both countries to demonstrate that they 
were still partnered with the U.S. on critical issues. The U.S was more inclined to favour 
TGN-based cooperation on this particular issue as it had the opportunity to contract 
partners according to its own need and terms of engagement.  
 
H3: TGN formation is most likely when there are short time horizons. 
Short time horizons in this instance refer to situations in which the cooperative 
arrangement is expected address a one-off problem or the issue under question requires a 
quick response. The PSI’s objective was to address the proliferation threat promptly. 
While there were already a number of IGO initiatives aimed at defusing proliferation 
incentives, including a series of committees and working groups established by NATO, 
the U.S. felt that these initiatives were inadequate in dealing with the current and rapidly 
changing proliferation threats. Alternatively, as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni notes, the U.S 
could have opted to reinforce the existing treaty base regime. States might seek an 
amendment to UNCLOS that would make WMD proliferation a criminal offence and 
grant a mandate for interdiction of WMD-related shipments.161 However, treaties are 
slow and cumbersome to amend. UNCLOS, for instance, took almost 10 years to 
negotiate and a further 12 years to enter into force. 162Additionally, unlike many IGOs 
which have a wider scope of cooperation, the PSI was intended to form the political core 
of cooperation over one specific issue – interdiction on the high seas. The PSI is not 
simply another mechanism for discussing issues that have already been addressed 
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through the NPT, the CWC, the BWC, the IAEA, and the export control TGNs. Rather, it 
is intended to address a critical fissure in the global non-proliferation regime, which 
would have been difficult to manage through a more formal mechanism. The PSI was 
formed as a response to short time horizons – the need to address a one off problem 
quickly.   
 
H4: Issue volatility and uncertainty favour TGN-based cooperation  
A fourth driver for TGN-based cooperation is issue volatility and uncertainty. 
U.S. officials were looking to build a system of cooperation that could respond to 
unpredictable threats quickly and effectively. The nature of the threat posed by terrorist 
networks is unpredictable and malleable. By the time states have negotiated a formal 
treaty based arrangement to deal with the problem, the threat may have escalated and the 
solution now requires considerable amending. The So San incident was a source of major 
embarrassment for the Bush administration but more importantly, it demonstrated that the 
U.S. desperately needed an international cooperative infrastructure that would help to 
inhibit and interdict the spread of WMD materials to rogue states and terrorist networks. 
While the technical problem that required overcoming was the So San incident, the 
impetus for a new interdiction mechanism was in fact the threat of WMD terrorism, 
driven by the failure of the state-centric treaty based regime to adequately address or 
reduce this threat. It is also critical to note that the while a new interdiction mechanism 
was essential; the U.S. did not have the time to build an entirely new international legal 
framework. U.S. officials were uncertain about how a multilateral treaty concerning the 
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interdiction of ships suspected of proliferating WMD related components would affect its 
own interests and the interests of its allies. The legal foundation of the global transport of 
American forces and military hardware is the exclusive flag state jurisdiction outlined in 
UNCLOS.163 By negotiating an international treaty that would grant states reciprocal 
stop-and-search powers, the U.S. would also subject its own ships to scrutiny by 
foreigners. Moreover, Article 51 of the UN Charter does not authorise the use of force on 
the basis of threat perception. Interdiction on the basis of suspicion that a ship is carrying 
WMD related materials would amount to the use of force under the UN Charter. Unless 
such interdiction is carried out with the express consent of the flag state or by the flag 
state itself, it constitutes an act of war and aggression. The PSI gets around the problems 
stemming from uncertainty and issue volatility through a number of ways. First, it is 
flexible and easily adaptable, which means that as the threat changes so can the solution 
and the framework of cooperation. Second, participants are not required to undertake a 
formal legal commitment. Instead, they make a political commitment that is consistent 
with relevant national and international laws. While the U.S. may have difficulty 
circumventing international laws, it can, however, shape loose political commitments to 
fit its own interest, thereby avoiding the possibility of having its own ships being 
searched by participant countries. Finally, by encouraging 102 states to endorse the PSI 
and by signing ship boarding agreements that are modelled after similar arrangements in 
the counter-narcotics arena, the U.S. has laid down procedures which enable it to board, 
search, and detain the cargo without being accused of war-mongering or aggression. In 
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the case of the PSI, issue volatility and uncertainty thus lent them towards TGN-based 
cooperation.  
 
H5: TGN-based cooperation is more likely if the issue is susceptible to 
intransigence at the international level.  
 One can expect TGN-based cooperation if the issue area under consideration is 
unlikely to receive quick and extensive cooperation through the treaty/IGO-based regime. 
The non-proliferation issue area, particularly, interdiction on the basis of suspicion that a 
ship is carrying WMD related materials, is no exception. International treaties often 
suffer from spoilers and are liable to founder under opposition and veto by powerful 
states. There are also concerns regarding the potential for an overly expansive 
interpretation or understanding of what an authorisation of forcible interdiction could 
mean. China, for instance, has yet to endorse the PSI and it has repeatedly refused to 
condone international interdiction.  It was Chinese resistance that lead to all references of 
interdiction being removed from the UN Security Council Resolution 1540. As early as 
1994, there were international political disagreements regarding how to develop a more 
comprehensive interdiction policy. During the North Atlantic Council negotiations, the 
U.K and France favoured a joint political and military approach, while a number of other 
European countries believed that the traditional non-proliferation regime was adequate 
and naval action constituted an unnecessary offensive action.164 Such divergent views are 
likely to replicate themselves and constitute an obstacle to negotiations when it comes to 
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a formal agreement. Voluntary cooperation through a political agreement as opposed to a 
legally-binding treaty allows the U.S to successfully sidestep the spoiler issue and 
overcome intransigence at the international level.   
 
H6: Issue intractability at the domestic level favours TGN-based cooperation  
 Finally, issue divisiveness and intractability at the domestic level also lends itself 
to TGN-based cooperation. International treaties that have legal implications for 
participating states often require formal ratification by domestic legislatures.  TGNs like 
the PSI, on the other hand, do not require domestic legislative approval. A legally binding 
treaty would have generated concern and widespread scepticism from the U.S. Navy and 
American shipping lobbies who defend the requirement of flag state consent and oppose 
reciprocal stop-and-search agreements. Such a legally binding and enforceable document 
might subject U.S private and public vessels, ships, and cargos to checks by other 
countries upon suspicion that they might be carrying WMD related materials. The loose 
political commitment generated by the PSI, on the other hand, is consistent with national 
and international legal frameworks. It simply calls upon states to strengthen their own 
domestic mechanisms and to take action in support of them. Furthermore, the PSI is 
shrouded in operational secrecy which allows the details of cooperation between states to 
go undetected by the domestic political constituencies. PSI exercises are not publicly 
reported upon and the precise number of desired, attempted, and successful interdictions 
through the PSI is unknown. Even at the outset, the White House staff was keen to avoid 
media leaks, as any advance public knowledge of the PSI proposal could jeopardise its 
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chances of success.165 The staff would rather potential initiative partners (and states that 
had were not invited to the Core Group) learn about the initiative via confidential U.S. 
government communications as opposed to through the press.166 In the case of the PSI, 
issue intractability at the domestic level thus favoured TGN-based cooperation, which in 
turn, allowed collective action to pass more easily under the domestic radar screen. 
Together, the six conditions outlined above served to lay the groundwork for the 
formation of the PSI. Without the U.S. acting as a quasi-imperial manager, it is unlikely 
that the PSI would have come about. The U.S. not only manages and coordinates the 
bureaucratic elements of the PSI but it also bankrolls the majority of the PSI training 
exercises. The opportunity for heterogeneous contracting, on the other hand, allowed the 
U.S. to shape the initiative in line with its own agenda and objectives. The U.S. could 
sidestep the international spoiler issue by inviting allies and countries that it already knew 
would play nice. Moreover, as an informal cooperative solution, which lacks a legal 
framework, the U.S. was able to quickly implement the initiative in order to address a 
pressing issue that required immediate attention. Finally, the secretive nature of the PSI 
enabled the U.S and other participating countries to minimise domestic controversy that 
could have otherwise posed a serious challenge international cooperation. This Chapter 
has, thus far, demonstrated that despite claims that it is not an organisation, the PSI is 
indeed a TGN, and that the conditions and drivers of TGN formation as identified in 
Chapter Two serve to explain why the PSI has arisen and taken the form that it has. Using 
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the information outlined above, the next section will demonstrate how the PSI represents 
an evolution of the TGN framework.  
  
3.2.3 PSI as an Evolution of TGNs within the Non-proliferation Regime 
 
TGNs are not an entirely new addition to the state-centric non-proliferation 
regime, however, the role that they play in this regime has evolved over time. Multilateral 
export control initiatives such as the Zangger Committee, the MTCR, the AG, and the 
NSG have all played an increasingly important and, at times, prominent role in aiding 
non-proliferation efforts since the early 1970s. These organizations certainly meet the 
criteria for transgovernmental networking and support the claim of a growing trend 
towards TGNs within the non-proliferation issue area. Export controls, for example, 
represent an attempt by states to manage the “cross-border flows of goods, technologies, 
and information,”167 and are a key functional element in any non-proliferation effort. As 
Michael Lipson notes, export control policy and practice have increasingly become a 
function of mid-level officials and experts working with a large degree of autonomy from 
the executive and the concerns of “high politics.”168 Agreements on common lists of 
controlled items, targets and procedures for controlling exports are implemented through 
national laws and regulations.169 With the exception of the Zangger Committee, which 
has a formal treaty basis, the majority of these TGNs are not directly and formally 
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attached to treaties. Yet, while these organisations certainly constitute TGNs, they are 
technically oriented. They function singularly to plug gaps and set standards that the 
formal state-centric structure, for a number of reasons, is unable to set. They are 
subsidiary to the existing treaty/IGO structure, providing compliance-based support to 
treaties as opposed to forming the core component of cooperation over a politically 
salient issue.  
Earlier in this chapter, I offered a diagrammatic representation of the traditional 
state-centric non-proliferation regime. I now provide a more specific illustration of the 
relationship between various components of this regime, particularly, the relationship 
between TGNs and the treaty/IGO-based structure. The core component of the non-
proliferation regime is a set of widely adopted international treaties, including the NPT, 
the CWC, and the BWC. The outer circle of this diagram represents formal IGOs such as 
the IAEA and the UN, which serve as an engine for deliberation or an enforcement 
mechanism, monitoring compliance with the proliferation treaties. Connected to the 
treaty/IGO structure are a range of TGNs, including the multilateral export and supplier 
groups as such as the NEC, the NSG, the AU, and the MTCR. These TGNs are closely 
tied with the formal regime. Although they do not have a treaty basis, they are not 
independent of the existing structure. 
Diagram A below, however, is no longer an accurate depiction of the architectures 
of cooperation that exist within the non-proliferation regime today. As this chapter has 
discussed in great detail, the contours of the non-proliferation regime and the nature of 
the regime components have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. Events 
such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the attacks of 9/11, and the discovery of the A.Q 
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IAEA/UN 
Khan nuclear weapons related trafficking network have created new vulnerabilities and 
threats for the United States. These events have provided evidence to support the claim 
that not only are rogue states and terrorist networks actively pursuing WMD capabilities, 
these actors are key components of a secondary proliferation market which exists beyond 
the scope of the traditional state-oriented apparatus. The PSI-TGN is the U.S 
government’s response to these threats. The PSI is not simply another example of 
transgovernmental networking or an attempt to plug regulatory and compliance gap in the 
traditional regime; it is a “more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing 
proliferation transfers to and from nations and nonstate actors of proliferation 
concern.”170  










                                                









Diagram B provides an illustration of this new and evolved non-proliferation 
regime. Alongside the traditional state-oriented apparatus now exists the PSI-TGN 
structure, which constitutes the core of political cooperation over a highly salient issue. It 
shares with the multilateral export control and supplier initiatives the fundamental 
characteristics of a TGN. However, unlike the export and supplier initiatives, the PSI is 
not a subsidiary component of the existing regime; rather it serves as a functional 
substitute for IGO/treaty based cooperation. The PSI supports the traditional regime by 
reinforcing the non-proliferation norm established through the core treaties. However, it 
has also helped to catalyse a shift in the long-held norm regarding the use of force and 
interdiction on the high seas. 
 





















The PSI has also given birth to and is supported by a number of another TGNs 
like the CSI and the SFI. These TGNs interact with the wider non-proliferation regime, 
creating a network of networks. For example, launched in 2002, the CSI  
“allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) working with host 
government Customs Services, to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo 
at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the 
United States.171”  
 
At present, there are 58 foreign ports that participate in the CSI, accounting for 85 
per cent of container traffic that is bound for the U.S.172 While the CSI was founded prior 
the PSI, it is a complementary initiative as it also focuses on enhancing global maritime 
security, albeit on a technical and less politically salient issue. The SFI was launched by 
the Department DHS in 2006 to support the efforts of the CSI and the PSI. This initiative 
“uses the latest available technology to enhance risk management tools to identify 
containers that pose a risk to the global maritime supply chain.”173 The SFI capitalised on 
the momentum that was generated by the PSI in order to reach a political commitment in 
the maritime container-shipping issue. This Initiative deploys a range of existing 
technology and proven nuclear detection devices in foreign ports to check containers 
headed to the U.S. If and when the alarm sounds, both the DHS and the host country will 
simultaneously receive an alert.174  
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While the initial non-proliferation TGNs were founded in the 1970s, it was only 
in the 2000s that TGNs began to grow in scope and number. Networks like the 
multilateral export and supplier initiatives served a regulatory and standard setting 
purpose but they also provided evidence that the TGN framework could be used as an 
effective and comparatively efficient method of cooperation on larger and more salient 
issues. Following 9/11, the threat of WMD terrorism, the weaknesses in the state-centric 
regime as highlighted by the So San incident, and the urgent need for the U.S to take 
action, the TGN framework seemed to provide an ideal architecture for cooperation. Not 
only did it offer the U.S. and the potential participants a range of functional benefits but it 
also enabled the U.S. to exercise managerial power on its own terms and in line with its 
own objectives. The evolution of the TGN framework within the non-proliferation regime 
occurred because the U.S. wanted to act quickly and effectively, whilst also maintaining a 
large degree of power over the shape and nature of action.  
In this Chapter, I have discussed how and why the non-proliferation regime has 
evolved over time. I have considered the prominence of formal state-oriented treaty based 
arrangements such as the NPT, the CWC, and the BWC and the growing trend towards a 
range of less formal initiatives, including multilateral export control efforts such as the 
Zangger Committee, the AG, and the NSG, and today the PSI. I have distinguished 
between export control TGNs and the PSI-TGN framework with the objective of 
demonstrating that the PSI-TGN is not simply a subsidiary to the existing treaty/IGO 
framework. Rather, it constitutes the engine for political cooperation. It represents an 
evolution of the role of TGNs within the non-proliferation regime. I have demonstrated 
that decision by U.S public officials to pursue cooperation through the PSI-TGN 
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framework was based on a calculation of the benefits that informal cooperation could 
provide to the U.S. as opposed to formal cooperation. 
In the future, TGNs may serve a dual purpose as they do within the non-
proliferation regime. They may strengthen and supplement traditional tools in some 
areas, while also promoting policy convergence and supplanting treaties in other areas. 
Although this Chapter has focused on the non-proliferation issue area, it is intended to 
further our understanding of the wider operational dynamics of TGNs. It is plausible that 
findings from the non-proliferation regime are applied to other issue areas. In the next 
chapter, I conclude by briefly considering an issue that is still awaiting an enforcement 
mechanism – small arms. The objective of the next chapter is to briefly consider the 
future of transgovernmental security cooperation and to determine whether the PSI-TGN 



















Chapter Four: PSI & The Future of Transgovernmental Security Cooperation 
 
 
A decade after the launch of the PSI and following numerous calls by U.S. 
government officials to institutionalise this TGN into a formal treaty, the PSI remains a 
loose, informal network of cooperation. While many have expressed concerns regarding 
the failure of U.S. officials to garner endorsement from key states like India, Pakistan, 
and China, the PSI-TGN framework has, nonetheless, served as an effective means to 
coordinate action on a highly salient issue. PSI participants have worked closely over the 
last ten years to impede shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials to 
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.  
The purpose of this concluding Chapter is to briefly consider the future of the PSI 
and transgovernmental security cooperation, in particular, the expansion of the PSI 
cooperative relationship to include relevant private sector actors. This chapter also asks 
whether the PSI interdiction model could be promoted to fit select transnational issues 
that require immediate action but where implementing rapid treaties may be politically 





4.1 Looking Forward: The Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
While the non-proliferation regime continues to be dominated by formal treaties, 
informal networks and arrangements have played an increasingly prominent role in 
policy discussions regarding how to curb the proliferation of dangerous materials.  As 
Roberts notes, the PSI and other recent loose non-proliferation initiatives are making 
concrete contributions to building a “network of networks” – creating a web that prevents 
the trafficking of WMD related materials.175  
I suggest that over the coming years, the PSI will evolve from a 
transgovernmental entity to a transnational entity. Transnational applies to when “we 
relax the assumption that states are the only actors, and “transgovernmental” applies 
when we relax the assumption that states act as units.”176 Aside from states and their sub-
state representatives, there are a more diverse set of public and private actors and 
interests at play in the non-proliferation issue area. Avant notes that among global 
governance arguments, the U.S. is “seen as a particularly important part of a complex 
array of state and non-state actors that work toward global goals.”177 The question of 
whether the PSI will endure over time, however, depends not simply upon which 
relationship U.S. policy makers decide to work through in pursuit of their goals but also 
                                                
175 Roberts, 2013 
176 Keohane and Nye, 1974, 41 
177 Avant, August-September 2012, p. 1 
 
 99 
the kind of role that the complex array of non-state actors play toward achieving this 
goal.  
At first glance, the issue area under question, interdiction on the high seas to curb 
the proliferation of WMD and related materials, falls neatly within the domain of high-
politics. Non-proliferation policy has traditionally been addressed via executive-level, 
treaty based cooperation. IGOs serve as the engine for deliberation and as a means of 
ensuring compliance as opposed to entities with their own interests and objectives. As has 
been discussed in this paper, there are positive incentives for decision-makers to 
cooperate on some issues at the sub-state level; nevertheless, these expert units are still 
derived from and attached to their respective states. Non-state actors, like private 
companies and civil society organisations, on the other hand, may have interests that 
diverge from the interests of the states that they operate in or are headquartered in. While 
sometimes TGN-based cooperation can help collective action to pass more easily under 
the domestic radar, this is not always possible. Private interest groups may be powerful 
enough to act as spoilers to cooperation or their support may be vital to the success of 
collective state action. For instance, in the non-proliferation issue area, and with specific 
relevance to the PSI, the question of liability for delayed cargo remains unresolved. As 
Roberts notes, most shipments are “just-in-time” deliveries, which means that the 
warehouse is either non-existent or kept to a minimum to reduce costs. Diverting a 
suspected ship to a port, off-loading its cargo, and inspect this cargo takes a great deal of 
time.178 These vessels can carry up to 10,000 containers. Who is held liable to the private 
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dealer that has lost money is an issue that is yet to be addressed by states,179 and it is a 
constant hurdle for cooperation with the relevant private actors. 
A governor’s ability to affect outcomes is largely dependent upon its interactions 
with others. As Avant, Finnemore, and Sell argue: “No governor governs alone.”180 
While private power is no substitute for state power, a new cast of global governors is 
emerging who also play a role in the process of governance. Thinking in such a 
governance framework clearly challenges the common dialogue about international 
relations, which has long privileged the state as the most relevant referent object and the 
subject of political debate in the international system. There are instances in the non-
proliferation issue area where private actors have played a positive role in facilitating 
collective action and achieving regulatory objectives. The CSI is a good example of a 
cooperative relationship between states and the container industry. The latter has agreed 
to implement anti-tampering devices and GPS tracking on containers to protect against 
diversion or tampering. The benefit for the industry is that it reduces the financial burden 
that arises as a result of being subject to mistaken stop-and-search interdictions. 
Furthermore, the PSI OEG recently hosted a series of meeting with the private sector. 
Individual countries like New Zealand have actively sought to improve the flow of 
information between their governments and private industry including local traders and 
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transport operators.181 While PSI formation was dependent upon transgovernmental 
cooperation, the long-term success of this initiative will depend upon transnational 
cooperation between a range of governors, including IGOs, NGOs, and domestic and 
transnational corporations. The PSI’s evolution from a transgovernmental network to a 
transnational network has already begun, and with the growing involvement of the 
private sector, it is likely to gain momentum over the next few years. This multilayer and 
multiactor approach will create a network of networks, that is, a web of denial that 
greatly diminishes if not eliminates the threat of WMD proliferation. 
 
4.2 Beyond Non-proliferation: Small Arms and Light Weapons 
 
Given the success of the PSI framework in engendering support from 102 
countries and in providing a proactive mechanism to counter proliferation, can a PSI-like 
framework also be promoted to fit select transnational issues that require immediate 
attention but where implementing rapid treaties may be politically difficult? The issue 
area under consideration here is small arms. Like the non-proliferation issue, it is highly 
politically salient and policy makers have struggled to reach a universal treaty concerning 
the interdiction of vessels that are suspected of carrying illicit small arms.  
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) can be defined as “hand-held and crew-
served weapons of under 100mm calibre. That covers everything from hand guns to 
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automatic rifles to shoulder-launched surface-to-air-missiles and their ammunition.”182 
The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought fresh supplies of assault rifles and 
a range of other easily portable weapons to the global market. As Waltz notes, these 
weapons “began flooding conflict zones, threatening life, and livelihood of the world’s 
poorest peoples.”183 SALW have played a critical role in sustaining civil war violence 
and many have argued that they constitute a fundamental threat to human security. 
Furthermore, Avant suggests that in the 1980s and 1990s, as the demand for larger 
conventional weapons waned, the production of small arms and the interconnectedness of 
arms manufactures grew.184 The increased prominence of illicit SALW on the global 
market led many, including activists, governments, and IGOs such as the UN, to call for 
industry regulation. The U.S., as the hegemon, found itself at the centre of this regulatory 
battle. On the one hand, the pro-regulation camp urged the U.S. to support and enforce 
regulation as a global public good.185 On the other hand, anti-regulation groups such as 
the NRA mobilised to pressure the U.S. government to use their sovereign authority to 
resist international regulation. This argument was derived from U.S. domestic concerns 
regarding the Second Amendment right to gun ownership.186 Formally, the U.S. policy on 
small arms constitutes a dual track approach - there exists a desire to promote legitimate 
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exports, while also curbing backchannel deals and the illicit spread of weapons. In reality, 
however, the position of the U.S. government has generally reflected that of the NRA – 
stymieing any form of regulation. The United States has also come to be viewed by most 
countries and pro-regulation groups as a major obstacle to formal treaty cooperation.  
On April 2, 2013, an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly voted 
in favour of a landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This treaty regulates the international 
trade in conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW). To the 
surprise of many, including the U.S. Senate, the U.S. government joined 152 other states 
in voting in favour of this treaty. The purpose of the ATT is to stop the illicit flow of 
destabilising weapons to conflict regions. Article 9 of this treaty refers to the transit or 
trans-shipment of SALW:  
“Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where 
necessary and feasible, the transit and transshipment under its jurisdiction of 
conventional arms under Article 2 (1) through its territory in accordance with 
relevant international law.”187  
 
The UN has hailed the ATT as a landmark document and a monumental 
achievement following seven years of negotiations. However, U.S. government officials 
are already questioning whether the U.S. will sign the treaty when it opens for signature 
on June 3. Even if the U.S. signs the treaty, it seems highly unlikely that the Senate will 
ratify and enact it.  
Assuming one of the two likely situations unfolds over the next few years – the 
U.S. does not sign the ATT or the U.S. signs the ATT but it does not receive Senate 
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ratification – could a PSI-like framework be used to monitor and regulate the illicit global 
trade in SALW? More importantly, would the U.S. be willing to exercise productive 
managerial power in order to guarantee the success of this initiative or would domestic 
interests such as those of the NRA be too great of an impediment to political 
cooperation?   
While, the Wassenaar arrangement is aimed at promoting transparency and 
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies, it lacks the apparatus necessary to regulate, monitor, and interdict the 
transit and transshipment of SALW. Theoretically, however, the PSI SIP could be 
combined with existing programmes to disrupt trade by land, sea, and air. To a certain 
extent, a PSI like model already exists. The U.S. Export Control and Related Border 
Security (EXBS) Program was established in the 1990s to help countries fulfil their 
obligations under UN Security Council 1540 and to help them establish capabilities to 
detect, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit transfers of WMD, WMD-related 
materials, and conventional weapons, including SALW. The EXBS is active in 50 
countries and the program is implemented by drawing on the expertise of IGOs, NGOs, 
foreign governments, the private sector, and U.S. Government agencies.188 The DOS 
EXBS webpage makes explicit reference to the PSI as one of the key initiatives that it is 
working to enforce. Both small arms and WMD require similar intelligence, legal, and 
military tools and capabilities, which would suggest that the SALW issue might lend 
itself to PSI cooperation and inclusion into the SIP. However, there is one primary reason 
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Accessed on: April 5, 2013   
 105 
for why the U.S may want to avoid making explicit reference to SALW in the SIP: 
opposition from the domestic arms control lobby. Given its track record of stymieing 
political cooperation, the NRA is likely to object to the U.S. supporting any written 
statement, albeit informal, that regulates the trade in SALW. The trade in small arms is an 
issue of high political salience where U.S domestic hurdles to cooperation may be too 
great to overcome. Perhaps, given the fact that SALWs are a key component of the EXBS 
program, which helps to enforce the PSI, and that the PSI is working to interdict 
shipments suspected of carrying WMD related materials, what may be more helpful and 
effective in stopping the illicit trade of SALW is the geographic expansion of the EXBS. 
Although the PSI does not directly cover SALW, EXBS participating states are already 
being trained by U.S. officials to interdict ships that are suspected of carrying illicit 
SALWs. Expanding participation of this programme may be a more effective means of 
addressing the issue as opposed to pursuing cooperation with the NRA on a formal or an 
informal commitment that they are unlikely to ever support.  
 
Conclusion 
International security is traditionally considered to be beyond the scope of 
transgovernmental networking. Yet, as this paper has demonstrated, TGNs have become 
an increasingly prominent governance apparatus within issue areas like non-proliferation. 
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the events of 9/11, and the growing threat of 
WMD terrorism, the U.S. reoriented its non-proliferation policy to target rogue states and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern. The chosen vehicle for implementing this new 
policy, the Proliferation Security Initiative, is not a formal treaty or an IGO; rather it is a 
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flexible and decentralised network – a looser mechanism for cooperation that can easily 
adapt to today’s diverse and unpredictable challenges. The trend towards TGNs in the 
non-proliferation regime is best explained by the range of functional and strategic 
benefits that TGNs can offer managerial and participant states, including flexibility, low 
transaction costs, and the ability to bypass domestic approval and ratification processes, 
as well as opportunities for heterogeneous contracting and the ability of certain powerful 
states to influence ideas, norms, and the operating environment for other states through 
the use of managerial power.   
While the literature on TGNs has largely ignored underlying power distributions, 
this paper has demonstrated that there exists a close relationship between power and 
transgovernmental networking. TGN-based cooperation is more likely to occur and 
succeed when there is concentrated power within an issue area, that is, the presence of a 
resource rich actor, like the U.S., willing to exercise managerial power in a productive 
way. Thus far, American officials have founded the vast majority of existing TGNs in 
close cooperation with their allies. However, going forward it would be of interest to see 
whether an alternative power or group of powers could assume the mantel of 
responsibility. Could countries like China and India also act as “quasi-imperial 
managers,” creating, implementing, and enforcing TGNs on issues where the U.S. has 
blocked regulatory efforts or chosen not to exercise leadership authority?  
In the future, TGNs may strengthen and supplement the traditional apparatus in 
some areas, while also promoting policy convergence and supplanting treaties in other 
areas. They may serve as stopgaps to formal treaties and mechanisms for plugging 
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regulatory holes, or for some issue areas and certain problems, they may present a better 
institutional design as opposed to formal centralised cooperation. The objective of this 
paper was to explore the conditions under which TGNs arise and take the form that they 
do. By identifying the threshold criteria for an entity to qualify as a TGN and the 
conditions under which TGNs arise, this paper has laid the groundwork for an analysis of 
TGN activity in other areas of security concern, like small arms. TGNs can help to 
reform and restructure the international security governance framework by making it 
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Appendix A: Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles 
 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more 
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, 
delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international 
law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states 
concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly 
committing to: 
 
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for 
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-
state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the 
PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because 
they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either 
selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. 
 
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning 
suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified 
information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate 
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize 
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts. 
 
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where 
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary 
relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these 
commitments. 
 
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, 
their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities 
permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to 
include: 
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or 
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to 
their jurisdiction to do so. 
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, 
to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal 
waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, 
that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or 
 115 
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are 
identified. 
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to 
the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the 
seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by 
such states. 
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, 
territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably 
suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to 
enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or 
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as 
requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such 
cargoes prior to entry. 
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another 
state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are 
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are 
identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes 
transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights. 
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for 
shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably 










Appendix B: States Endorsing the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of 
Interdiction Principles as of November 20, 2012 
 
Afghanistan Croatia Luxembourg Russia 
Albania Cyprus Macedonia Samoa 
Angola Czech Republic Malta Saudi Arabia 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Denmark Marshall Islands San Marina 
Argentina Djibouti Moldova Serbia 
Armenia Dominica Mongolia Singapore 
Australia Dominican Republic Montenegro Slovakia 
Azerbaijan El Salvador Morocco Slovenia 
Bahamas, The Estonia The Netherlands Spain 
Bahrain Fiji New Zealand Sri Lanka 
Belarus Finland Norway St. Lucia 
Belgium France Oman St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Belsize Georgia Panama Sweden 
Bosnia Germany Papua New Guinea Switzerland 
Brunei Darussalam Greece Paraguay Tajikistan 
Bulgaria Holy See Philippines 
Cambodia Liberia Poland 
Canada Libya Portugal 
Chile Liechtenstein Qatar 
Colombia Lithuania Romania 
 
 
 
